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Two papers in this last Eurosurveillance issue of 2013, 
one by Reusken et al. [1] and one by Hemida et al. [2], 
look into the potential animal reservoir for the Middle 
East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) coronavirus (CoV). 
This virus, which emerged in 2012 and was reported for 
the first time in September, has caused 163 cases and 
71 deaths as of 2 December 2013 [3]. However, many 
questions remain on its origin, reservoir and transmis-
sion patterns [4]. 
The two papers investigate the seroprevalence of anti-
bodies against MERS-CoV and MERS-like CoV in a simi-
lar set of domestic livestock, namely camels, cattle, 
goats, sheep and chicken, in two different geographic 
hotspots in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, respectively, 
where the largest described clusters of MERS have 
occurred to date. The papers complement each other 
and support the authors’ earlier findings that drom-
edary camels could be a potential reservoir for MERS-
CoV [5,6]. The results presented now are compelling 
evidence that in the studied regions high proportions 
of dromedary camels are exposed to a MERS-CoV or 
MERS-like CoV already in their first year of life. Hemida 
at al. conclude that camels could be infected early in 
life, and Reusken et al. additionally raise the possibil-
ity that the serological reactivity early in life could be 
due to maternal antibodies. 
While the presented studies confirm the potential role 
of dromedary camels as MERS-CoV reservoir, they do 
not support a similar role of other common domestic 
livestock in the affected regions in the Middle East. 
Neither of the two studies detected antibodies in 
chicken, cattle or goats. Although most tests in sheep 
were negative, one particular assay gave positive 
results in a few animals, and the authors stress that 
this needs further investigation. 
While the papers in today’s issue provide further 
insight into the possible animal reservoir, the primary 
source of MERS-CoV infections remains unclear and the 
link to humans needs to be elucidated further as expo-
sure to animals has only been documented for a limited 
number of human MERS cases. We look forward to see-
ing more studies in the near future that will shed light 
on the as yet unknown characteristics of this disease 
that raised much attention among infectious disease 
experts in 2013.
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In October 2013, autochthonous dengue fever was 
diagnosed in a laboratory technician in Bouches-du-
Rhône, southern France, a department colonised by 
Aedes albopictus since 2010. After ruling out occu-
pational contamination, we identified the likely chain 
of local vector-borne transmission from which the 
autochthonous case arose. Though limited, this sec-
ond occurrence of autochthonous dengue transmission 
in France highlights that efforts should be continued 
to rapidly detect dengue virus introduction and pre-
vent its further dissemination in France.
In October 2013, the French National Reference 
Laboratory for arboviruses (NRL) – hosted at the Institut 
de Recherche Biomedicale des Armées, Marseille – 
reported an autochthonous case of dengue fever to 
the Regional Health Authority of Provence-Alpes-Côte 
d’Azur. The case lived in the department of Bouches-
du-Rhône, France. The national and regional health 
authorities initiated a multidisciplinary investigation 
to determine the source of infection of the case and 
the extent of possible dissemination of dengue virus 
(DENV).
Case report
On 11 October 2013, a female laboratory technician 
in her early fifties, residing and working in the area 
of Aix-en-Provence, Bouches-du-Rhône department, 
developed sudden fever with incapacitating myalgia, 
predominantly in her legs. She had not left the depart-
ment in the 15 days before onset of symptoms. Four 
days later, she developed a rash on her legs and con-
sulted her general practitioner, who prescribed symp-
tomatic treatment of fever and aches. As the symptoms 
persisted, she was taken to a hospital’s emergency 
department on two days later. On admission to hospi-
tal, she was normotensive, with a body temperature of 
38.4 °C. Laboratory analyses showed a normal white 
blood cell (7,200/mL; norm: 4,000–10,000 /mL) and 
platelet count (197,000/mL; norm: 150,000–450,000/
mL) and an elevated C-reactive protein level (145 mg/L; 
norm: <7.5 mg/L). As her condition had improved, 
despite the rash having expanded to her arms and 
back, she was discharged after 24 hours, with a diag-
nosis of ‘probable viral infection’. She consulted a 
dermatologist three days later, who suspected an arbo-
viral infection and sent blood samples to the NRL. 
A panel of sera obtained during the acute and convales-
cent phases (days 6, 10, 14 and 35 after symptom onset) 
was investigated using in-house real-time reverse 
transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) and 
serological assays (in-house IgM antibody capture 
(MAC)-enyzme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) 
and indirect IgG ELISA) for DENV and West Nile, chikun-
gunya and Toscana viruses (Table). For the first serum 
sampled on day 6, the real-time RT-PCR for DENV was 
positive, with a high cycle threshold (Ct) value (indi-
cating a very low viral load), serotyping by real-time 
RT-PCR was negative, DENV non-structural protein 1 
(NS1) detection by rapid diagnostic test (SD Bioline) 
was negative, but IgM and IgG antibodies against 
DENV antigens were detected). IgM and IgG antibod-
ies against DENV were also detected in the next two 
serum samples (on days 10 and 14). For the last serum 
specimen, sampled on day 35, only DENV-specific IgG 
antibodies were detected: the specificity of these anti-
bodies was determined by seroneutralisation against 
DENV serotypes 1 to 4 (DEN1–4) and West Nile virus [1]. 
For West Nile virus, DEN1, DEN3 and DEN4, the 90% 
neutralisation titre was <1/20. A 90% neutralisation 
titre of 1/160 against DEN-2 was highly suggestive of 
an infection of this patient by DEN-2. 
Background
Infection with DENV – a member of the family 
Flaviviridae, genus Flavivirus – leading to dengue 
haemorrhagic fever and shock syndrome, is responsi-
ble for substantial morbidity and mortality in popula-
tions living in the tropics and among travellers to these 
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regions [2,3]. The global burden of dengue ranges 
from an estimated 50–100 million DENV infections 
worldwide every year according to the World Health 
Organization [3] to a recent estimate of 390 million 
DENV infections per year [4]. The virus is considered an 
emerging threat to Europe because of its recent detec-
tion in southern Europe due to the continuous spread 
of Aedes (Stegomyia) albopictus (Skuse), an invasive 
mosquito species and well-known vector of chikungu-
nya virus and DENV [5,6]. Public health concern has 
been heightened since limited foci of local transmis-
sion of DENV were reported in September 2010 in Nice, 
southern France, and Croatia and more recently in 2012 
in Madeira, Portugal (where the vector was Ae. aegypti) 
[7-9].
Ae. albopictus was introduced in southern France in 
2004, near the Italian border [10]. Since then, it has 
continuously spread eastwards and northwards and 
has to date colonised 17 departments (administra-
tive districts) including Bouches-du-Rhône since 2009 
(Figure 2) [10,11]. Prevention of the introduction of 
DENV and chikungunya virus in the departments where 
Ae. albopictus is established falls under a national 
preparedness and response plan created in 2006 
[12]. Implemented each year during the vector activity 
period, from 1 May to 30 November, the plan is based 
on enhanced surveillance aiming at the early detection 
of imported dengue and chikungunya cases. 
In mainland France, dengue has been a mandatorily 
notifiable disease since April 2006 [13]:  a case should 
be reported immediately after laboratory confirmation 
[12]. In addition, in the areas and period of vector activ-
ity, physicians and laboratories are asked to immedi-
ately notify suspected imported cases to the local 
health authorities and to send blood samples directly 
to the NRL for laboratory confirmation. These actions 
Figure 1
Timeline of epidemiological features and laboratory results of sera from autochthonous and imported case of dengue, 
Bouches-du-Rhône, France, September–November 2013
DENV: dengue virus; EID: Entente Interdépartementale pour la Démoustification du littoral Méditerranéen; ELISA: enzyme-linked 
immunosorbent assay; ND: not done; NLR: National Reference Laboratory for arboviruses; RHA: regional health agency ;  
RT-PCR: reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction.
a Initially reported as a suspected case.
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guide entomological investigations followed by vector 
control measures when appropriate. 
The investigation
As the case could have been exposed to blood during 
her laboratory work, two hypotheses on the source 
of infection and mode of DENV transmission were 
explored: occupational transmission through acciden-
tal exposure to blood from a viraemic patient or local 
vector-borne transmission. 
Occupational transmission
Considering an incubation period of 2 to 14 days, in 
agreement with earlier reports of occupational DENV 
infection [14-16], we defined the period of likely expo-
sure as 27 September to 8 October. The autochtho-
nous case carried out on average 60 venous punctures 
a day from patients. She had no recollection of any 
direct blood exposure during this period. However, 
she reported not wearing gloves while collecting 
blood and presented skin excoriations on her fingers. 
Among patients sampled in her workplace, none had 
blood taken for dengue fever suspected by a physician. 
Nevertheless, we screened for DENV all patients sam-
pled in the laboratory during the case’s likely period 
of infection who presented with symptoms of or a his-
tory compatible with dengue. The criteria for screen-
ing were fever without diagnosis, reported travel in an 
Figure 2
Departments colonised by Aedes albopictus, France, 2004–2013
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area where dengue was reported, leucopenia, throm-
bocytopenia, hepatic cytolysis, negative viral serology 
and negative rapid or blood smear tests for malaria. 
The NRL conducted DENV real-time RT-PCR and serol-
ogy on the 15 blood samples still available from the 
18 patients who met the selection criteria. All tested 
negative. 
Vector-borne transmission
The patient reported no mosquito bites but remem-
bered a sudden pricking sensation compatible with a 
mosquito bite on the evening of 3 October (eight days 
before symptom onset), when she was near her work-
place in Bouches-du-Rhône. She reported no recent 
contact with travellers returning from an area with cur-
rent epidemics or endemic for dengue.
A review of the surveillance database did not identify 
any case of imported dengue confirmed by the NRL in 
Bouches-du-Rhône since 1 August 2013. However, one 
suspected case had been notified in a neighbouring 
department in a woman who developed fever and a 
rash on 19 September, five days after returning from 
the Caribbean island of Guadeloupe, where a dengue 
outbreak was ongoing [17]. Sera collected on day 2 of 
her illness tested negative for DENV, West Nile, chi-
kungunya and Saint Louis encephalitis viruses by our 
in-house real-time RT-PCR and serological assays. An 
entomological investigation of her residential area and 
places visited had been carried out on 24 September, 
before the negative test results were available. Among 
the places visited, the woman mentioned a short visit, 
the day before symptom onset, close to (less than 200 
metres from) the workplace of the autochthonous case. 
Although an ovitrap placed nearby this workplace had 
been found colonised with 43 eggs of Ae. albopictus in 
late September 2013, no evidence of mosquito activity 
was found during an investigation on 23 September, 
hence no vector control measures were implemented at 
that time. 
After the detection of the autochthonous case, we 
retested the serum sample of the suspected imported 
case by sero-specific real-time RT-PCR for DENV and 
by rapid diagnostic test for NS1 detection. An addi-
tional serum sample was collected on day 56 for serol-
ogy testing. The NS1 test and the pan-DENV real-time 
RT-PCR were negative, the real-time RT-PCR for DEN-2 
was positive with a high Ct value. In the later serum 
sample (day 56), only IgG antibodies against DENV 
were detected. These laboratory findings confirmed 
an infection with DEN-2 for this patient returning from 
Guadeloupe (considered the index case). 
Control measures
Under the hypothesis of local vector-borne transmis-
sion, two places were chosen for identifying primary 
or secondary cases of DENV infection and for conduct-
ing immediate control measures: the autochthonous 
case’s home, where she stayed while viraemic, and her 
place of work close to which eggs of Ae. albopictus had 
been detected in September.
The local health authorities and vector control opera-
tors jointly carried out the following activities in an 
area of 200 metres around the autochthonous case’s 
home and workplace: door-to-door case finding; 
any mosquito breeding sites treated by mechanical 
destruction or larvicide treatment sites; and adulti-
cide sprayings. Physicians and laboratories in the area 
were asked to report any patients with symptoms com-
patible with DENV infection since 1 August, including 
sudden onset of fever (>38.5 °C) and at least one pain 
symptom, including headache, arthralgia, myalgia, 
lower back pain or retro-orbital pain. Two suspected 
cases were identified. Neither tested positive for DENV 
by real-time RT-PCR or serology. 
Discussion
This second report of autochthonous dengue in main-
land France follows a cluster of two locally acquired 
cases in Alpes-Maritimes in 2010 [7]. Because our 
patient was a laboratory technician who daily collected 
blood specimens, we not only explored vector-borne 
local transmission of DENV but also thoroughly inves-
tigated potential occupational transmission. The latter 
hypothesis appears unlikely since, unlike the situa-
tion for other occupational dengue cases [14-16], our 
investigation pinpointed neither a viraemic or infected 
patient sampled nor any accidental exposure to blood 
at the laboratory during the likely exposure period of 
the case. 
Several findings are in favour of vector-borne transmis-
sion in the Bouches-du-Rhône department. Firstly, our 
retrospective laboratory confirmation of an imported 
case of dengue, who had visited the immediate vicin-
ity of the autochthonous case’s workplace, while 
potentially viraemic (one day before symptom onset). 
Secondly, the 22-day delay between symptom onset 
of the imported and autochthonous case, which is 
compatible with the intrinsic (1–14 days) and extrin-
sic (10 days) incubation period for DENV [18]. Thirdly, 
the presence of Ae. albopictus eggs in the ovitraps in 
September, indicating the presence of the potential 
vector. Finally, laboratory confirmation of DENV infec-
tion of the same serotype, DEN-2, in both the autoch-
thonous case and the case imported from Guadeloupe. 
In August to October 2013, DEN-2 was not the prevail-
ing circulating serotype in Guadeloupe, but remained 
frequent [17].
The virological data presented in this paper on the two 
human cases of DENV infection do not follow the clas-
sical and average kinetics of viraemia and antibody 
response. The individual host response is known to be 
variable regarding the viral load in blood, the duration 
of viraemia and the duration of IgM detection and is also 
dependent on the DENV responsible for the infection 
[19,20]. Unfortunately, although viral RNA was detected 
in the acute phase sample of the autochthonous case, 
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we were unable to serotype and sequence the ampli-
fied product due to a very low viral load. Further com-
parison of the virus isolates by sequencing is therefore 
impossible. Two blind passages on Vero and C6/36 cell 
lines will be carried out to try to isolate the virus from 
the acute phase sera. NS1 was not detected for these 
two cases. However, the detection of NS1 is generally 
less sensitive than viral genome detection by real-time 
RT-PCR [20,21]. 
This local transmission of dengue highlights once again 
that mainland France is subject to overspill of dengue 
outbreaks, particularly from the French Antilles in the 
Caribbean. The implemented investigations and control 
measures were derived from a national plan against 
dengue and chikungunya that provides a framework 
for rapid review and exchange of information between 
epidemiological, entomological, laboratory and medi-
cal experts and decision-makers. 
The autochthonous case was diagnosed only after a 
third and specialised medical consultation. We need 
therefore to further raise the awareness of physicians 
and laboratories regarding diagnosis of dengue in 
international travellers and the possibility of autoch-
thonous transmission in areas where Ae. albopictus is 
established. Similarly, we should not discontinue our 
efforts to inform travellers to areas affected by dengue 
about individual protection against mosquito bites and 
early symptoms of dengue.
No further case could be related to this local transmis-
sion cycle of dengue in Bouches-du-Rhône. Although 
precautionary mosquito control was applied, this could 
very well have been a self-limiting viral dissemination 
since it occurred shortly before the end of the vector 
activity period in late November.
Conclusion
Although limited, this autochthonous transmission of 
DENV in southern France is a clear reminder that local 
transmission can be triggered in Europe by the intro-
duction of the virus in areas colonised by Ae. albopic-
tus, as it occurred already in 2010 in Nice. The French 
preparedness and response plan, in operation since 
2006, proved pivotal to detect and control this threat.
Reducing the risk of local DENV dissemination to zero 
appears an elusive goal in the context of the continu-
ous spread of Ae albopictus. Coordinated enhanced 
surveillance and response are therefore the backbone 
of the prevention of the occurrence of autochthonous 
cases and the containment of possible outbreaks. 
Such a plan requires, however, multidisciplinary exper-
tise and resources and should be adapted wisely and 
regularly to ensure its sustainability and efficiency. In 
addition, innovative vector control methods and fur-
ther elucidation of the dynamics of DENV transmission 
in non-endemic areas are needed to keep Europe safe 
from dengue.
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We report six confirmed cases of Legionnaires’ dis-
ease in Scotland caused by Legionella longbeachae 
serogroup 1, identified over a four-week period in 
August–September 2013. All cases required admission 
to hospital intensive care facilities. All cases were 
amateur gardeners with frequent exposure to horti-
cultural growing media throughout their incubation 
period. L. longbeachae was identified in five samples 
of growing media linked to five cases. Product tracing 
did not identify a common product or manufacturer.
We describe a cluster of Legionnaires’ disease cases 
caused by Legionella longbeachae identified in 
Scotland between August and September 2013. This 
was an unprecedented cluster due to the number 
of cases identified in such a short time period and 
the geographical proximity of the cases. A national 
Incident Management Team (IMT) investigated this 
cluster, focussing on epidemiological, clinical microbi-
ology and environmental issues.
Scotland, with a population of 5.2 million inhabitants, 
usually records 20–45 cases of Legionnaires’ disease 
per year, of which around 60% are travel-related [1]. 
Since 2008, a small but increasing number of cases 
of Legionnaires’ disease caused by L. longbeachae 
have been identified in Scotland. This amounts to 18 
cases since 2008, with eight cases in 2013, as of 18 
November [2, unpublished data for 2013]. This increase 
has not been mirrored across the rest of the United 
Kingdom (UK) and Europe. In 2012, a national IMT 
investigated the 10 cases detected between 2008 and 
2012. The investigation focussed on: case ascertain-
ment; case characteristics; growing media produc-
tion; and a discussion of whether additional public 
health action was warranted [2]. It identified that the 
most likely reason for case ascertainment in Scotland 
but not the rest of the UK, was the testing protocol in 
use, driven by an active Scottish Legionella Reference 
Laboratory (SHLMPRL) that routinely used a Legionella 
species PCR test and L. longbeachae specific serology 
tests. These tests were not routinely used in the rest 
of the UK. No differences in production of horticultural 
growing media in Scotland and the rest of the UK were 
identified [2]. 
Investigation of the cluster
Incident management 
Following identification of two confirmed (culture posi-
tive) cases of L. longbeachae and an additional sus-
pected third case (Legionella species PCR positive), 
NHS Lothian (one of the health boards in Scotland) 
called a Problem Assessment Group on 6 September 
2013. Upon confirmation of the third case (by culture), 
identification of a fourth suspected case and another 
confirmed case in neighbouring NHS Tayside, a 
national IMT meeting was held on 12 September 2013. 
Leadership of the investigation was passed to Health 
Protection Scotland (HPS), the national organisation 
for health protection in Scotland. 
Information about presentation of illness, details of 
testing and background information on L. longbeachae 
was provided to local medical services in NHS Lothian 
and Tayside, including general practice, emergency 
care, respiratory wards and to the national health 
helpline (NHS24), following the first IMT meeting. 
All health boards in Scotland received public health 
alerts highlighting the situation. Other UK countries 
also received these alerts and the European Centre for 
Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) was informed.
There was significant press interest in this cluster of 
cases. Reactive media statements were prepared after 
every IMT meeting. Following press reporting of this 
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cluster, representatives from growing media retailers 
approached HPS for advice they could provide to cus-
tomers to reduce risk of illness. Growing media retail-
ers have had increased awareness of Legionnaires’ 
disease from press reporting of cases in Scotland since 
2008. A statement was developed for the retail indus-
try describing the low risk of infection and highlighting 
general gardening hygiene.  
Epidemiological investigation
Case definitions are detailed in Table 1. These were 
adapted from the ECDC case definitions [3] with addi-
tional details of time, place and exposure. A ‘possible’ 
category was introduced to include those who met 
clinical and epidemiological criteria whilst test results 
were awaited. In reality, this ‘possible’ category was 
not used as cases were only notified to public health 
teams following microbiological analysis establishing 
them as ‘confirmed’ or ‘probable’ cases. Cases had 
a date of onset between 11 August and 10 September 
(Table 2). Cases were confirmed as L. longbeachae 
infections on average 12 days (range 7–16 days) after 
the initial diagnosis of community-acquired pneumo-
nia. Due to the relative rarity of this infection, clini-
cians may not consider Legionnaires’ disease until 
some time into the diagnostic process. This is particu-
larly likely where there is a negative Legionella urinary 
antigen test result, which is often used by clinicians to 
exclude Legionnaires’ disease. Cases were within 130 
km of each other, in two neighbouring health board 
regions.
All confirmed cases were interviewed by nurses in 
the health board’s health protection team, using a 
standard questionnaire. This sought details on clinical 
presentation and testing, travel history, recent hospi-
talisation, possible water aerosol exposures, possi-
ble horticultural growing media exposure, gardening 
activities. In the first instance, partners and relatives 
were interviewed, as the cases themselves were too 
unwell to be interviewed. 
All cases had severe community-acquired pneumo-
nia and were all admitted to intensive care facilities. 
They remained in hospital for an average of 22 days 
(variation 11–43 days). The cases comprised of three 
females and three males with a mean age of 70 years 
(range 55–84 years). Five out of six cases had health 
problems contributing to underlying immunosuppres-
sion. Five out of six cases were active or ex-tobacco 
smokers. All cases had lived at home throughout their 
exposure period of 14 days and had not undertaken 
any activities outside their usual activity pattern. Five 
out of six cases were keen amateur gardeners who had 
regular exposure to horticultural growing media during 
the incubation period of their illness. One case did not 
describe any clear exposure to growing media. No other 
relevant exposures were identified for these cases. 
In addition to the six confirmed cases of Legionnaires’ 
disease there was one case of probable Legionnaires’ 
disease in a keen gardener with frequent exposure to 
growing media during the incubation period of their 
illness. This patient had a moderately high titre of 
1:128 to L. longbeachae which reverted to negative on 
follow up testing; no acute serum sample or sputum 
was available for testing. This case was clinically less 
severe than the other cases and was managed in the 
community. The patient was younger than the other 
cases and did not have any underlying morbidity. This 
case was detected some time after the six confirmed 
cases, but had an estimated date of onset within the 
four-week period between August and September. This 
case was diagnosed retrospectively, following treat-
ment for pneumonia and it is likely that detection was 
Table 1
Case definitions for Legionnaires’ disease cases caused by Legionella longbeachae serogroup 1, Scotland, August–September 
2013
Confirmed case
•	 clinical	or	radiological	evidence	of	community-acquired	pneumonia	with	disease	onset	on	or	after	1	August	2013	
AND
•	 evidence	of	having	been	exposed	in	Scotland	to	horticultural	growing	media	(including	composted	material	
produced locally or domestically) in the 14 days prior to the onset of symptoms  
AND
•	 isolation	of	Legionella longbeachae from respiratory secretions
Probable case
•	 clinical	or	radiological	evidence	of	community-acquired	pneumonia	with	disease	onset	on	or	after	1	August	2013	
AND
•	 evidence	of	having	been	exposed	in	Scotland	to	horticultural	growing	media	(including	composted	material	
produced locally or domestically) in the 14 days prior to the onset of symptoms  
AND
•	 detection	of	Legionella species specific nucleic acid in respiratory secretions (accompanied by a negative urinary 
antigen test), or a detected rise in L. longbeachae serum antibody levels of at least fourfold, or a single high titre 
of L. longbeachae serum antibody
Possible case
•	 clinical	or	radiological	evidence	of	community-acquired	pneumonia	with	disease	onset	on	or	after	1	August	2013	
AND
•	 evidence	of	having	been	exposed	in	Scotland	to	horticultural	growing	media	(including	composted	material	
produced locally or domestically) in the 14 days prior to the onset of symptoms  
AND
•	 no	current	microbiological	evidence	as	to	the	causal	agent
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due to information about this cluster being circulated 
to general practice physicians.
Clinical microbiological findings
Cases 1–4 were identified by the local clinical diagnos-
tic laboratory in NHS Lothian, which had implemented 
testing of severe community-acquired pneumonia lower 
respiratory tract samples by both L. pneumophila and 
Legionella species PCR in 2010. Legionella species PCR 
positive samples were referred to SHLMPRL for confir-
mation and culture. All isolates were L. longbeachae 
serogroup 1. Cases 5 and 6 were identified in NHS 
Tayside shortly after the first Lothian cases. Sputum/
bronchial alveolar lavage samples were cultured in 
the local diagnostic laboratory and Legionella colo-
nies were isolated. These isolates were identified as L. 
longbeachae serogroup 1. This local diagnostic labo-
ratory did not routinely use a Legionella species PCR 
test. All patient isolates were genotyped by amplified 
fragment length polymorphism (AFLP) at SHLMPRL. 
Testing results are summarised in Table 2. 
Environmental investigation
The environmental investigation focussed on three 
main areas:
1. identifying specific gardening activities and expo-
sures which may be considered as a high risk; 
2. establishing sources through microbiological 
testing; 
3. tracing supply chain and manufacture of potential 
sources. 
There was no common theme in gardening activities 
and no particular single gardening activity or garden 
exposure was common amongst the cases, other than 
use of recently purchased shop-bought growing media. 
Samples of any remaining growing media were taken 
for microbiological testing. 
In five out of six cases, the use of growing media was 
investigated. Shop-bought growing media was of a 
range of brands bought in different premises. All had 
been stored at home inside, either in the cases’ house 
or greenhouse/polytunnel/garden shed/garage. Using 
the barcodes on the bags of growing media, batch 
number and manufacturer details were obtained. There 
was no common manufacturing site; manufacturing 
sites were located in England, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland. Of those growing media produced at the same 
manufacturing site, there was no common batch num-
ber. In addition, there was no common supplier of 
composted material to these manufacturing sites. All 
of these growing media contained composted green 
material and four out of five contained peat.
Microbiological testing of bagged growing media and 
other garden samples obtained from the cases’ homes, 
detected L. longbeachae serogroup 1 in five out of 11 
samples tested, resulting in positive growing media 
samples linked to five cases. In all cases, the same 
AFLP DNA profile was found in the patient isolate and 
the implicated growing media isolate. Each patient and 
growing media isolate was identified as one of three 
circulating AFLP types regularly identified in Scotland. 
Table 2
Summary of clinical microbiological testing for the six cases of Legionnaires’ disease caused by Legionella longbeachae 
serogroup 1, Scotland, August–September 2013
Case
Date of onset of 
illness 
(2013)
Urinary antigen 
test
PCR
Culture
Serology 
(Legionella longbeachae 
specific antibody response)
OrganismLegionella 
pneumophila
Legionella 
species
1 11 August negative negative positive positive four-fold rise
Legionella 
longbeachae 
serogroup 1
2 15 August negative negative positive positive four-fold rise
Legionella 
longbeachae 
serogroup 1
3 24 August negative negative positive positive four-fold rise
Legionella 
longbeachae 
serogroup 1
4 27 August negative negative positive positive single high titre
Legionella 
longbeachae 
serogroup 1
5 28 August negative negative – positive –
Legionella 
longbeachae 
serogroup 1
6 10 September negative negative positive positive single moderate titre
Legionella 
longbeachae 
serogroup 1
–: test not performed
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The genetic similarity or diversity of all the strains is 
currently being analysed by whole genome sequencing. 
Given the match in organism and exposure during the 
incubation period, it is highly likely that these grow-
ing media were the source of infection for these cases. 
Further work is ongoing looking at further genetic 
analysis and comparison of the L. longbeachae clini-
cal and environmental isolates, using whole genome 
sequencing.
Discussion
Detection of L. longbeachae infection is unusual 
in Europe with 43 cases reported to the European 
Surveillance System (Tessy) between 2005 and 
2012 (personal communication, Encarna Gimenez, 
September 2013). Diagnosis of Legionnaires’ disease 
in the European Union relies heavily on urinary antigen 
testing that does not detect L. longbeachae. Culture has 
always been the gold standard for the definitive diag-
nosis of Legionnaires’ disease [3]. However, Legionella 
culture requires specific laboratory media and exper-
tise; it may miss cases that would be detected by PCR 
[4] and results may not be available in a timely man-
ner to allow effective clinical and public health action. 
Detection of the four Lothian cases relied on the local 
diagnostic service using a Legionella species PCR test, 
a test which, to our knowledge, no other diagnostic 
laboratory in the UK uses. In addition to culture and 
PCR, a four-fold change in titre to a L. longbeachae spe-
cific antibody was seen in the three cases from whom 
sufficient samples were taken. Serological diagnosis 
of Legionnaires’ disease for serogroups and species 
other than L. pneumophila serogroup 1 has never been 
fully validated because of the rarity of these infections. 
However, in cases of severe Legionnaires’ disease, a 
Legionella species-specific positive PCR and a greater 
than four-fold rise in titre to a particular Legionella 
species, have helped to verify the causative organ-
ism. These data support the growing suspicion that 
L. longbeachae infection is under-ascertained in 
Scotland and probably across Europe. Following detec-
tion of this cluster, Public Health England has imple-
mented a Legionella species PCR test in the National 
Reference Laboratory for a trial period. Assessment 
of this should take into account the possible seasonal 
nature of L. longbeachae infections, coinciding with 
seasonal use of growing media. It is also recommended 
that national surveillance units consider ways of rais-
ing awareness amongst frontline clinical staff, to con-
sider the diagnosis of Legionnaires’ disease (including 
non-pneumophila species infections) in those with 
community-acquired pneumonia.
L. longbeachae infection accounts for approximately 
half of all cases of Legionnaires’ disease in Australia 
[5] and New Zealand [6], where growing media is peat-
free and a major component is composted green mate-
rial such as pine woodchip and bark. Predominantly 
peat-based growing media is used in Europe and this is 
likely to be a low risk for L. longbeachae contamination. 
In the UK, there is political pressure and legislation in 
place to reduce the volume of peat used in growing 
media to preserve peat stocks [7]. As peat is phased 
out, the volume of composted green material in grow-
ing media will increase. It is therefore likely that we 
will see increasing numbers of cases of Legionnaires’ 
disease caused by L. longbeachae infection, providing 
that we can detect them.  
No single source of contaminated growing media could 
be identified in this cluster, which supports research 
findings that L. longbeachae is ubiquitous in soils and 
growing media [8,9]. Growing media manufactured 
in the UK for retail is required to meet manufacturing 
standards (PAS 100 [10]) which includes some microbi-
ological testing, but not testing for Legionella bacteria. 
As in many other infections, a combination of infec-
tious dose, mode of infection and host susceptibility 
is likely to influence outcome. It is not clear whether 
clinical infection follows inhalation of a particular 
infectious dose of bacteria, or at which stage in the 
manufacturing and/or retail process a bacterial load 
might be reached which poses a risk to susceptible 
individuals. It is possible that higher concentrations of 
Legionella bacteria develop during storage of growing 
media prior to use. All of the cases in this cluster with 
exposure to growing media had stored bags of grow-
ing media in their home or in sheds or other enclosed 
spaces. It is possible that the unusually warm summer 
in Scotland in 2013 caused a rise in temperature of the 
growing media during the day whilst being protected 
from cool nights indoors, providing opportunity for the 
Legionella to grow and resulting in a higher than usual 
concentration of these organisms in the product. 
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Between June and September 2013, sera from 11 drom-
edary camels, 150 goats, 126 sheep and 91 cows were 
collected in Jordan, where the first human Middle-
East respiratory syndrome (MERS) cluster appeared 
in 2012. All sera were tested for MERS-coronavirus 
(MERS-CoV) specific antibodies by protein microarray 
with confirmation by virus neutralisation. Neutralising 
antibodies were found in all camel sera while sera 
from goats and cattle tested negative. Although six 
sheep sera reacted with MERS-CoV antigen, neutralis-
ing antibodies were not detected.
In the period between June and September 2013, sera 
from 11 dromedary camels, 150 goats, 126 sheep and 91 
cows were collected predominantly in the al Zarqa gov-
ernorate, Jordan, where the first human Middle-East 
respiratory syndrome (MERS) cluster appeared in April 
2012 [1]. All sera were tested for the presence of MERS-
coronavirus (MERS-CoV) specific antibodies by protein 
microarray with confirmation by virus neutralisation. 
Neutralising antibodies to MERS-CoV were found in all 
sera from dromedary camels while the sera from goats 
and cattle tested negative. Although six of 126 sheep 
sera reacted with the MERS-CoV antigen, neutralising 
antibodies were not detected. The reactivity of sheep 
sera from this region observed in the microarray war-
rants further study. 
Background
In 2012 MERS-CoV was identified in patients with 
severe respiratory disease in the Middle East. As of 
2 December 2013, a total of 163 laboratory-confirmed 
cases including 70 deaths have been reported to 
the World Health Organization (WHO) [2]. All cases 
reported to date were linked to Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia (SA) or the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE). Human to human transmission has been 
observed in healthcare and family settings [3]. Various 
studies indicate that the observed MERS-CoV diversity 
in humans results from multiple independent introduc-
tions in the human population in the Middle East [5-7] 
and the number of these sporadic, primary infections 
is still increasing [2]. The animal reservoir(s) for MERS-
CoV are still unknown but serological studies demon-
strated that dromedary camels in the Canary Islands, 
Egypt and Oman have been infected with MERS-CoV 
or MERS-related-CoV [8,9]. Of these countries, human 
cases have only been detected in Oman [2]. 
Data provided by the Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations (FAO) from 2012 show that cows, 
dromedary camels, goats and sheep are the main 
sources of meat and milk in the affected countries 
[4]. In addition, in Saudi Arabia, where the majority of 
MERS cases have been reported, roughly one sheep is 
sacrificed for each pilgrim or one camel for seven pil-
grims in the Hajj (yearly Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca), 
which can amount up to the slaughter and worldwide 
distribution of meat of around three million Middle-
Eastern sheep and camels, based on the pilgrim num-
bers reported for 2011 and 2012 [10]. The continued 
occurrence of human MERS cases, the presence of neu-
tralising antibodies in camels and the extensive animal 
exposure (including animal products) of humans war-
rant extensive studies in livestock aimed at identifying 
the possible reservoir of MERS-CoV. 
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Figure 1
Animal sampling locations for the MERS-CoV serological study, relative to the location where MERS-CoV human cases 
were identified in April 2012, Jordan, June–September 2013
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MERS-CoV: Middle East Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus.
A represents Al-Zarqa, the city were the first human Middle-East respiratory syndrome cases were identified in April 2012. 
B-F are locations where animal sampling took place between June and September 2013.
Source: map adapted from: http://d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=5402&lang=en
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In April 2012, an outbreak of acute respiratory illness 
occurred in an intensive care unit in a public hospital 
in Zarqa city, Zarqa governorate, Jordan. Retrospective 
testing identified MERS-CoV as the confirmed and 
probable causative agent of two and 11 patients respec-
tively. Ten people in the outbreak were healthcare 
workers (HCW). The two confirmed cases, a HCW and 
an admitted patient, died [1]. Although epidemiological 
investigations identified limited nosocomial transmis-
sion, the primary source for MERS-CoV transmission to 
humans was not identified. 
Middle East Respiratory Syndrome 
coronavirus serological study in livestock 
Between June and September 2013, sera as well as fae-
cal swabs from 11 dromedary camels, 150 goats, 126 
sheep and 91 cows were collected predominantly in the 
al Zarqa governorate, Jordan (Table 1, Figure 1). All sera 
were tested for the presence of IgG antibodies reactive 
with MERS-CoV, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
coronavirus (SARS-CoV), and human coronavirus OC43 
(HCoV-OC43) S1 antigens exactly as described before 
[9,11]. HCoV-OC43 is serologically closely related to 
bovine coronavirus (BCoV) and used as a proxy to 
detect antibodies against BCoVs that are commonly cir-
culating in ungulates [9]. 
All 11 dromedary camel sera and six of 126 sheep sera 
had antibodies against the MERS-CoV S1 antigen while 
there was no reactivity in goat and cow sera. Four of 
11 dromedary camels, 23/91 cows, 128/150 goats and 
all sheep reacted with HCoV-OC43 antigen. None of the 
sera bound to SARS-CoV antigen (Figure 2).  
For confirmation, all camel and sheep sera (n= 137) 
were tested in a MERS-CoV neutralisation assay, 
exactly as described before [9]. All camel sera had 
MERS-CoV neutralising antibodies with titres varying 
between 1:20 and 1:80, while no neutralising antibod-
ies were detected in the sheep sera (Table 2 and data 
not shown). As coronavirus serology is potentially 
complicated due to the general circulation of BCoVs in 
these four livestock species (cross-reactivity needs to 
be excluded), a comparative plaque reduction neutrali-
sation test (PRNT) for MERS-CoV and BCoV was per-
formed on all camels sera and a subset of goat, sheep 
and cow sera, exactly as described before [9] (Table 
2). All camel sera inhibited MERS-CoV plaque forma-
tion with titres varying between 1:40 and 1:80, while 
again no inhibition was observed with the selection of 
sheep sera.  Four of the 11 camel sera also inhibited 
BCoV plaque formation with titres between 1:160 and 
1:320, confirming the microarray results for these sam-
ples. BCoV neutralising titres varied between 1:40 and 
1:160 for the selection of sheep sera, between 1:40 and 
1:320 for the subset of goat sera and between 1:40 and 
1:>1,280 for the subset of bovine sera. 
Faecal samples of camels and sheep were analysed for 
identification of viral sequences using pancoronavirus 
and specific polymerase chain reaction (PCR) methods 
[9]. Three BCoV sequences but no MERS-CoV or MERS-
related CoV sequences were obtained from sheep rec-
tal swabs.
Discussion
Here, we describe a serological study in various live-
stock species (n= 378) of economic importance in a 
Table 1
Characteristics of animals included in the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) coronavirus serological study, Jordan, 
June–September 2013 (n= 378 animals)
Animals (total numbers) Locationa,b Number Sex Age
Dromedary camels (n=11) Ec, outdoors 11 M 3–14 months
Sheep of Awassi breed (n=126) Ec, indoors 20 F > 2 years
C, outdoors 53 F + M All agesd
D, outdoors 27 F + M > 2 years
B, indoors 26 F + M All agesd
Cows (n=91) C, indoors 35 F Unknown
F, indoors 56 F Unknown
Goats of local breed (n=150) D, indoors 10 F + M Unknown
C, unknown 91 F + M Unknown
B, unknown 49 F + M Unknown
M: male; F: female.
a The letters B, C, D, E, and F refer to locations indicated in Figure 1.
b If known, it is indicated whether the animals were kept indoors or outdoors.
c The respective locations of the sheep and camels were 5 km apart and there was no contact between the sheep and camels. 
d Females were older than 2 years and males were younger than 6 months.
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Figure 2
Reactivity of livestock sera (n= 378) from Jordan with three coronavirus S1 antigens
Ag: antigen; MERS-CoV: Middle East Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus; hCoV-OC43: human coronavirus OC43; SARS-CoV: Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus.
Column scatterplot of relative fluorescent intensities per antigen (y-axis) measured by protein microarray for dromedary camel (n=11), goat 
(n=150), sheep (n=126) and cow (n=91) sera from Jordan at serum dilution 1:20. 
Black lines indicate medians. Dashed black line is cutoff of the assay for MERS-CoV. Dashed grey line is cutoff of the assay for HCoV-OC43.
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Table 2
Results of neutralising assays for Middle East Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus and bovine coronavirus, serological study in 
livestock, Jordan, June–September 2013
Number of serum 
samples
Positive MERS-CoV neutralisation titrea 
n (titres)
Positive BCoV neutralisation titreb 
n (titres)
Dromedary camels n= 11
MERS-CoV antigen array signal (RFU)
<10,000 0 0 (NS) 0 (NS)
10,000–20,000 0 0 (NS) 0 (NS)
20,000–30,000 0 0 (NS) 0 (NS)
30,000–40,000 2 2 (1:20 to 1:40) 0 (NS)
>40,000 9 9 (1:20 to 1:80) 4 (1:160 to 1:320)
hCoV-OC43 antigen array signal (RFU)
<10,000 9 9 (1:20 to 1:80) 2 (1:320)
10,000–20,000 2 2 (1:80) 2 (1:160)
20,000–30,000 0 0 (NS) 0 (NS)
30,000–40,000 0 0 (NS) 0 (NS)
>40,000 0 0 (NS) 0 (NS)
Sheep n= 10
MERS-CoV antigen array signal (RFU)
<10,000 4 0 (NS) 3 (1:80 to 1:160)
10,000–20,000 0 0 (NS) 0 (NS)
20,000–30,000 1 0 (NS) 1 (1:40)
30,000–40,000 2 0 (NS) 2 (1:40 to 1:160)
>40,000 3 0 (NS) 2 (1:40 to 1:80)
hCoV-OC43 antigen array signal (RFU)
<10,000 1 0 (NS) 0 (NS)
10,000–20,000 0 0 (NS) 0 (NS)
20,000–30,000 1 0 (NS) 0 (NS)
30,000–40,000 2 0 (NS) 2 (1:40)
>40,000 6 0 (NS) 6 (1:40 to 1:160)
Goat n= 8
MERS-CoV antigen array signal (RFU)
< 10,000 7 0 (NS) 3 (1:40 to 1:320)
10,000–20,000 1 0 (NS) 1 (1:160)
20,000–30,000 0 0 (NS) 0 (NS)
30,000– 40,000 0 0 (NS) 0 (NS)
>40,000 0 0 (NS) 0 (NS)
hCoV-OC43 antigen array signal (RFU)
<10,000 3 0 (NS) 0 (NS)
10,000–20,000 0 0 (NS) 0 (NS)
20,000–30,000 0 0 (NS) 0 (NS)
30,000–40,000 1 0 (NS) 0 (NS)
>40,000 4 0 (NS) 4 (1:40 to 1:320)
Bovine n= 7
MERS-CoV antigen array signal (RFU)
<10,000 7 0 (NS) 7 (1:80 to 1: >1,280)
10,000–20,000 0 0 (NS) 0 (NS)
20,000–30,000 0 0 (NS) 0 (NS)
30,000–40,000 0 0 (NS) 0 (NS)
>40,000 0 0 (NS) 0 (NS)
hCoV-OC43 antigen array signal (RFU)
<10,000 4 0 (NS) 4 (1:80 to 1:160)
10,000–20,000 3 0 (NS) 3 (1:160 tp 1: >1,280)
20,000–30,000 0 0 (NS) 0 (NS)
30,000–40,000 0 0 (NS) 0 (NS)
>40,000 0 0 (NS) 0 (NS)
BCoV:  bovine coronavirus; hCoV-OC43: human coronavirus OC43; MERS-CoV: Middle East Respiratory Syndrome virus; NS: not shown;  
PRNT: plaque reduction neutralisation test; RFU: relative fluorescence units.
a based on both microneutralisation with starting dilution 1:10 and PRNT with starting dilution 1:40. 
b based on PRNT with starting dilution 1:40. 
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region in Jordan where a cluster of human MERS cases 
occurred. 
No evidence for the presence of antibodies directed 
against MERS-CoV was found in 91 cattle and 150 goat 
sera. MERS-CoV neutralising antibodies were found 
in all 11 dromedary camel sera. Circulation of BCoV in 
dromedary camels is known but cross-neutralisation 
between MERS-CoV (a lineage C beta-coronavirus) and 
BCoV (a lineage A beta-coronavirus) or other CoVs, 
including SARS-CoV (a lineage B betacoronavirus), has 
been conclusively excluded in previous studies and was 
illustrated again in this study in the comparative PRNTs 
[8,9]. These observations indicate that MERS-CoV or a 
highly related virus circulated in dromedary camels in 
a region where transmission to humans occurs. 
The neutralisation titres observed in the Jordan camel 
sera were lower than observed with sera from Oman 
but in the same range as those observed on the Canary 
Islands [9]. The dromedary camels in this study were 
calves, only three to 14 months of age, and these low 
titres might reflect the presence of waning maternal 
antibodies. However, maternal antibodies in drom-
edary camels reportedly decline rapidly two to five 
weeks after birth [12] and much higher antibody titres 
against MERS-CoV were observed in adult dromedary 
camels (older than four years of age) in the Middle-
East region and the Horn of Africa [8,9] (and data not 
shown). Therefore an alternative explanation could be 
that the camels had just been infected and antibody 
titres were still rising. 
Interestingly, six sheep sera reacted with MERS-CoV 
S1 antigen on the array while previous validation 
experiments using sheep sera from the Netherlands 
showed no reactivity [9]. This previous study included 
HCoV-OC43 S1-reactive and non-reactive sheep sera 
emphasising that there should not be any cross-reactiv-
ity between the MERS-CoV antigen and BCoV-specific 
antibodies due to BCoV circulation. However, none of 
the 126 sheep sera showed MERS-CoV neutralising 
activity. The applied sheep sera were highly haemo-
lytic which may have caused some assay interferences.
Our observation strengthens our earlier study in which 
MERS-CoV neutralising antibodies were found in drom-
edary camels in Oman where human cases have been 
reported as well [2]. Until the virus that elicits these 
antibodies in camels is detected, sequenced and com-
pared to the viruses sequenced from human patients, 
it remains unclear whether this livestock species is 
indeed infected with MERS-CoV and thus represents an 
immediate source for human infection. However, our 
observations should be used to focus virological and 
serological studies in livestock, especially dromedary 
camels and sheep, and including humans handling 
these animals and their products.
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In Saudi Arabia, including regions of Riyadh and 
Al Ahsa, pseudoparticle neutralisation (ppNT) and 
microneutralisation (MNT) tests detected no antibod-
ies to Middle East Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus 
(MERS-CoV) in sheep (n= 100), goats (n= 45), cattle 
(n= 50) and chickens (n= 240). Dromedary camels 
however, had a high prevalence of MERS-CoV antibod-
ies. Bovine coronavirus (BCoV) infected sera from cat-
tle had no cross-reactivity in MERS-CoV ppNT or MNT, 
while many dromedary camels’ sera reacted to both 
BCoV and MERS-CoV. Some nevertheless displayed 
specific serologic reaction profiles to MERS-CoV.
In a seroepidemiological study of domestic livestock 
(sheep, goats, cattle, chicken) and dromedary cam-
els from Saudi Arabia, we find that only dromedary 
camels have evidence of seropositivity to Middle 
East Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV), 
suggesting an infection with a MERS-CoV-like virus. 
Although some dromedary camels examined had spe-
cific serologic reaction profiles to MERS-CoV, many 
had sera displaying reactivity to both MERS-CoV and 
bovine coronavirus (BCoV) and the sera appear to have 
an unusually broad pattern of cross-reactivity for these 
related viruses. This needs to be considered when 
interpreting seroepidemiological data by carrying out 
parallel microneutralisation tests for both MERS CoV 
and BCoV.
Middle East Respiratory 
Syndrome coronavirus
MERS coronavirus was recognised as a cause of 
severe human respiratory disease in 2012 [1]. As of 
22 November 2013, 157 laboratory-confirmed, and 19 
other probable cases of MERS have been reported, 
69 of these being fatal [2]. Sporadic or index cases 
account for approximately 40% of the cases and have 
occurred in Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia 
and United Arab Emirates. Imported cases have been 
reported in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Tunisia and 
United Kingdom, with secondary transmission docu-
mented in some of these cases [2,3]. Human-to-human 
transmission has occasionally been observed, the 
largest cluster of such secondary transmission being 
reported from Al Ahsa, Saudi Arabia [4]. Phylogenetic 
analysis suggests considerable diversity within MERS-
CoV sequences analysed to date, with two distinct 
clades of virus being noted [5].
Index cases of MERS appear to be zoonotic in origin, 
with contact with domestic livestock (e.g. camels, 
sheep) being reported in some of these patients [3]. But 
neither the proximate animal source of human infection 
nor the natural reservoir of the virus is known. Closely 
related, but not identical viruses have been found in 
species of insectivorous bats [6]. There is a prelimi-
nary report of a short fragment of virus genome almost 
identical to MERS-CoV reportedly found in Egyptian 
tomb bats [7].
Two recent studies from Oman and Egypt respectively, 
two Middle-Eastern countries adjacent to affected 
ones, reported high rates of MERS-CoV seroprevalence 
in dromedary camels [8,9]. However, there have been 
no seroepidemiological data of domestic livestock, 
camels or wildlife from affected countries, to date. 
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Seroepidemiological study
Serum samples were collected from dromedary camels 
(n= 310), sheep (n= 100), goats (n= 45), cattle (n= 50) 
and chicken (n= 240) from Riyadh, Al Ahsa and other 
regions of Saudi Arabia (Figure).
The MERS-CoV serology methods used have been 
described in a previous publication [9]. The sera were 
heat inactivated at 56 ºC for 30 minutes and screened 
for antibody to MERS-CoV at a serum dilution of 1:20 
in a MERS-CoV pseudoparticle neutralisation test 
(ppNT) [9]. Camel sera (n=56) that were seropositive 
at a screening dilution of 1:20 in the ppNT assay were 
randomly selected, representing each age group, less 
than one year (n=15), one to three years (n=12), four to 
five years (n=16) and older than five years (n=13), and 
titrated to end point in the MERS-CoV ppNT, MERS-CoV 
microneutralisation test (MNT) and bovine coronavirus 
(BCoV) MNT.
The MNTs were done using MERS-CoV (strain: EMC) 
obtained from Dr R Fouchier, Erasmus MC, Rotterdam 
and bovine coronavirus (ATCC BRCV-OK-0514-2). The 
MNTs were done on Vero cells (ATCC CCL-81) for MERS-
CoV and HRT-18G cells (obtained from ATCC) for BCoV, 
respectively. Serial two-fold dilutions of heat-inac-
tivated sera (56 ºC for 30 minutes) were mixed with 
equal volumes of 200 tissue culture infective dose 
(TCID)50 of virus and incubated for one hour at 37 ºC. 
The virus–serum mixture was then added in quadru-
plicate to cell monolayers in 96-well microtitre plates. 
After one hour of adsorption, the virus-serum mixture 
Figure
Locations where serum samples were collected for the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) coronavirus 
seroepidemiological study in domestic livestock, Saudi Arabia, 2010–2013 
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was removed and 150µl of fresh culture medium was 
added to each well and the plates incubated at 37 ºC in 
5% CO2 in a humidified incubator. A virus back-titration 
was performed without immune serum to assess input 
virus dose. 
Cytopathic effect (CPE) was read at three days post 
infection for MERS-CoV and four days post infection 
for BCoV. The highest serum dilution that completely 
protected the cells from CPE in half of the wells was 
defined as the neutralising antibody titre. Positive and 
negative control sera were included in each assay. 
As positive controls, we used a convalescent serum 
from a human patient with MERS kindly provided by 
Dr C Drosten, Institute of Virology, University of Bonn 
Medical Centre, Bonn (MERS-CoV ppNT 1:160); and 
sera from two experimentally infected macaques (ppNT 
titres 1:40) and a non-infected control macaque (ppNT 
<1:20) kindly provided by Bart Haagmans, Erasmus MC 
as reported previously [9]. Additional positive and neg-
ative controls used were sera from dromedary camels 
from Egypt previously found to be seropositive (ppNT 
1:320) and sero-negative (ppNT<1:20) [9]. Antisera to 
BCoV from an experimentally inoculated gnotobiotic 
calf and guinea pig were provided by Dr. Linda Saif.
Results 
Sera that were positive in the MERS-CoV ppNT test at a 
screening dilution of 1:20 are shown in Table 1. 
A gnotobiotic calf and guinea pig B CoV antisera that 
had a homologous reaction titre of ≥1:1,280 and 1:80 
respectively, did not cross-neutralise MERS-CoV in 
either the MERS-CoV ppNT or MNT. None of the sheep, 
goat, cattle or chicken sera had any MERS-CoV ppNT 
Table 1
Location and time of sampling of animals chosen for MERS-CoV ppNT and proportion of serum samples positive at 1:20 
dilution, Saudi Arabia, 2010–2013 (n=745 samples)
Animals Location (number of animals) Collection period Serum samples collected N
Sera positive in MERS-CoV 
ppNT N (%)
Dromedary camels Al-Ahsa (120), Riyadh (190) 2012–2013 310 280 (90)
Sheep Al-Ahsa (100) 2012–2013 100 0 (0)
Goats Al-Ahsa (15), Taif (10), Madinah (10), Qatif (10) 2010–2012 45 0 (0)
Chicken Al-Ahsa (120), Dammam and Alkhober (80), Abqaiq (40) 2012–2013 240 0 (0)
Cattle Al-Ahsa (17), Taif (13), Madinah (10), Qatif (10) 2010–2013 50 0 (0)
MERS-CoV ppNT: Middle East Respiratory Syndrome pseudoparticle neutralisation test.
Riyadh province is in central Saudi Arabia; Al Ahsa, Quatif, Dammam, Alkhober and Abqaiq are in the eastern part of Saudi Arabia; Madinah 
and Taif are in the western part of Saudi Arabia (Figure).
Table 2
Stratification by age and location of dromedary camels testing positive in the MERS-CoV ppNT assay at a serum dilution of 
1:20, Saudi Arabia, 2012–2013 (n=310 animals)
Age 
group 
(years)
Riyadh Al Ahsa Overall
Animals tested
N
Animals testing 
positive 
N (%)
Animals tested
N
Animals testing 
positive
N (%)
Animals tested
N
Animals testing 
positive 
N (%)
<1 21 18 (86) 44 29 (66) 65 47 (72)
1–3 55 52 (94) 51 49 (96) 106 101 (95)
4–5 52 51 (98) 24 23 (96) 76 74 (97)
>5 62 57 (92) 1 1 (100) 63 58 (92)
Total 190 178 (94) 120 102 (85) 310 280 (90)
MERS-CoV ppNT: Middle East Respiratory Syndrome pseudoparticle neutralisation test.
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Table 3A
Serology titres for MERS-CoV and BCoV in dromedary camel sera, Saudi Arabia, 2012–2013 (n=56)
Sera IDs Age group in years MERS-CoV ppNT titre MERS-CoV MNT titre BCoV MNT titre Reaction profile Region
1 <1 1:2,560 1:160 1:20 MERS-CoV specific Riyadh
2 <1 1:320 1:20 <1:10 MERS-CoV specific Riyadh
3 <1 ≥1:5,120 1:640 1:40 MERS-CoV specific Al-Ahsa
4 <1 1:1,280 1:320 <1:10 MERS-CoV specific Al-Ahsa
5 <1 1:640 1:40 1:160 BCoV specific Riyadh
6 <1 1:640 1:40 1:320 BCoV specific Riyadh
7 <1 1:160 1:10 1:40 BCoV specific Riyadh
8 <1 1:1,280 1:80 1:640 BCoV specific Al-Ahsa
9 <1 <1:20 <1:10 1:160 BCoV specific Al-Ahsa
10 <1 1:80 1:10 1:40 BCoV specific Al-Ahsa
11 <1 1:80 1:10 <1:10 Indeterminate Riyadh
12 <1 ≥1:5,120 1:640 1:640 Indeterminate Riyadh
13 <1 1:2,560 1:320 1:320 Indeterminate Al-Ahsa
14 <1 1:2,560 1:320 1:320 Indeterminate Al-Ahsa
15 <1 1:1,280 1:160 1:320 Indeterminate Al-Ahsa
16 1–3 ≥1:5,120 ≥1:1,280 <1:10 MERS-CoV specific Riyadh
17 1–3 1:160 1:20 <1:10 MERS-CoV specific Riyadh
18 1–3 ≥1:5,120 ≥1:1,280 1:80 MERS-CoV specific Riyadh
19 1–3 1:640 1:80 <1:10 MERS-CoV specific Al-Ahsa
20 1–3 1:640 1:160 <1:10 MERS-CoV specific Al-Ahsa
21 1–3 1:640 1:40 1:160 BCoV specific Riyadh
22 1–3 1:20 <1:10 1:160 BCoV specific Riyadh
23 1–3 1:2,560 1:80 >1:1,280 BCoV specific Al-Ahsa
24 1–3 1:320 1:10 1:20 Indeterminate Riyadh
25 1–3 1:640 1:80 1:40 Indeterminate Riyadh
26 1–3 1:160 1:20 1:40 Indeterminate Al-Ahsa
27 1–3 1:1,280 1:640 1:320 Indeterminate Al-Ahsa
28 4–5 ≥1:5,120 1:640 1:160 MERS-CoV specific Riyadh
29 4–5 1:160 1:160 1:40 MERS-CoV specific Riyadh
30 4–5 ≥1:5,120 1:320 1:80 MERS-CoV specific Riyadh
31 4–5 ≥1:5,120 1:640 1:80 MERS-CoV specific Riyadh
32 4–5 ≥1:5,120 ≥1:1,280 1:40 MERS-CoV specific Riyadh
33 4–5 1:640 1:160 <1:10 MERS-CoV specific Riyadh
34 4–5 ≥1:5,120 ≥1:1,280 <1:10 MERS-CoV specific Al-Ahsa
35 4–5 1:320 1:40 1:640 BCoV specific Riyadh
36 4–5 1:1,280 1:320 >1:1280 BCoV specific Riyadh
37 4–5 1:2,560 1:640 >1:1280 BCoV specific Riyadh
38 4–5 1:320 1:40 1:320 BCoV specific Al-Ahsa
39 4–5 ≥1:5,120 1:320 >1:1,280 BCoV specific Al-Ahsa
40 4–5 1:160 1:40 1:320 BCoV specific Al-Ahsa
41 4–5 1:1,280 1:160 1:320 Indeterminate Riyadh
42 4–5 1:2,560 1:320 1:640 Indeterminate Riyadh
43 4–5 1:1,280 1:160 1:320 Indeterminate Al-Ahsa
BCoV: bovine coronavirus; ID: identity; MERS-CoV: Middle East Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus; MNT: microneutralisation test; ppNT: 
pseudoparticle neutralisation test.
The reaction profile was denoted as MERS-CoV specific if the antibody titre to MERS-CoV was ≥4 fold higher than BCoV; and BCoV specific if 
the titre to BCoV was ≥4 fold higher than for MERS-CoV. Other sera are regarded to have an indeterminate reaction profile.
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activity while 280 of 310 (90%) dromedary camel sera 
were seropositive. The age-group and location of the 
camels tested and their serostatus in the screening 
assay are shown in Table 2. While 47 of 65 (72%) of 
camels less than one year of age were seropositive, 
233 of 245 (95%) of camels older than one year were 
seropositive to MERS-CoV in the ppNT test (chi-squared 
test, p<0.01). 
A randomly selected subset of 54 ppNT seropositive 
sera and two ppNT negative sera were titrated by 
MERS-CoV ppNT, MERS-CoV MNT and BCoV MNT (Table 
3). MERS-CoV ppNT titres ranged from 1:20 to ≥1:5,120 
and MERS-CoV MNT titres ranged from <1:10 (in one 
serum only) to ≥1:1,280. Dromedary camel sera, which 
have ≥4 fold higher antibody MERS-CoV MNT titres 
compared to BCoV MNT titres are denoted as ‘MERS-
CoV specific’ reaction patterns. Sera with comparable 
(within 4-fold) titres to both viruses and are denoted as 
‘indeterminate’ reaction patterns while those that have 
≥4 fold higher titres to BCoV are regarded as ‘BCoV 
specific’. 
Twelve of the 50 cattle sera were randomly selected for 
BCoV MNT and 11 sera were positive (Table 4). 
Discussion
This study was conducted Saudi Arabia, including 
in central and eastern provinces from which most 
of the human cases of MERS-CoV hitherto had been 
detected; in particular, the Al Ahsa region from where 
the largest cluster of human-to-human transmission 
of the disease has occurred [4] and the Riyadh region, 
which appears to host the greatest genetic diversity of 
MERS-CoV within Saudi Arabia [5]. None of the cattle, 
goat, sheep or chickens had any detectable antibody 
to MERS-CoV. While larger numbers of such livestock 
in the vicinity of confirmed cases of MERS need to be 
examined, our data do not indicate that these species 
of domestic livestock are commonly infected by MERS-
CoV. As expected, BCoV antibody was common in cat-
tle with 11 of 12 cattle sera having evidence of BCoV 
MNT antibody, but these sera did not cross-react with 
MERS-CoV.
Dromedary camels from the central province of Riyadh 
as well as the eastern province, Al Ahsa, had com-
parably high levels of seropositivity to MERS-CoV 
by ppNT tests. Camels less than one year of age had 
lower seroprevalence (72%) than those older than one 
year of age (95%) (p <0.01). Some dromedary camels 
have high titres to MERS-CoV in the absence of any 
reactivity to BCoV confirming that these animals are 
being infected by a virus very different to BCoV, which 
could be identical or closely related to MERS-CoV [8,9]. 
Similarly, some animals appear to be infected by a 
BCoV-like virus without cross-reactivity to MERS-CoV. If 
we consider just the ’MERS-CoV specific’ reactions, we 
observe that these animals are getting infected within 
the first year of life (Table 3). 
Table 3B
Serology titres for MERS-CoV and BCoV in dromedary camel sera, Saudi Arabia, 2012–2013 (n=56)
Sera IDs Age group in years MERS-CoV ppNT titre MERS-CoV MNT titre BCoV MNT titre Reaction profile Region
44 >5 ≥1:5,120 1:640 1:80 MERS-CoV specific Riyadh
45 >5 1:1,280 1:320 1:80 MERS-CoV specific Riyadh
46 >5 1:640 1:640 1:40 MERS-CoV specific Riyadh
47 >5 <1:20 <1:10 1:80 BCoV specific Riyadh
48 >5 1:80 1:80 1:320 BCoV specific Riyadh
49 >5 ≥1:5,120 1:640 >1:1280 Indeterminate Riyadh
50 >5 1:1,280 1:320 1:160 Indeterminate Riyadh
51 >5 1:1,280 1:640 1:320 Indeterminate Riyadh
52 >5 ≥1:5,120 1:640 >1:1,280 Indeterminate Riyadh
53 >5 1:1,280 1:640 1:320 Indeterminate Riyadh
54 >5 1:640 1:640 1:640 Indeterminate Riyadh
55 >5 ≥1:5,120 ≥1:1,280 >1:1,280 Indeterminate Riyadh
56 >5 1:320 1:20 1:40 Indeterminate Riyadh
BCoV: bovine coronavirus; ID: identity; MERS-CoV: Middle East Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus; MNT: microneutralisation test; ppNT: 
pseudoparticle neutralisation test.
The reaction profile was denoted as MERS-CoV specific if the antibody titre to MERS-CoV was ≥4 fold higher than BCoV; and BCoV specific if 
the titre to BCoV was ≥4 fold higher than for MERS-CoV. Other sera are regarded to have an indeterminate reaction profile.
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Naturally infected cattle with BCoV titres of up to 
1:640 and an experimentally infected calf with a titre 
of ≥1:1,280 had no cross-reaction to MERS-CoV in 
ppNT and MNT assays. Previously, we had shown that 
human sera with antibody to Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS)-CoV failed to react with MERS-CoV, 
moreover SARS-CoV was not neutralised by dromedary 
camel sera with high antibody titres to MERS-CoV [9]. 
In contrast, while some dromedary camel sera had 
mono-specific reactions to either MERS CoV or BCoV, 
many sera have ‘indeterminate’ reaction profiles with 
reactivity to both MERS-CoV and BCoV (Table 3). It is 
possible that sequential infection of dromedary camels 
with different coronaviruses may lead to a broadening 
of the serological cross-reaction profile. Alternatively, 
it is possible that the unusual single chain immuno-
globulins possessed by camels [10] may give broader 
serological cross-reactivity than is seen with other spe-
cies. In any event, these findings highlight the impor-
tance of parallel titration of sera to both MERS-CoV and 
BCoV when interpreting seroepidemiological results.
The exact identity of this MERS-CoV-like virus can only 
be established by characterising this virus from drome-
dary camel specimens. As many of the dromedary cam-
els sampled in this study were already seropositive to 
MERS-CoV, we did not attempt to detect viral RNA in the 
serum samples. There are (as yet unpublished) reports 
of detecting a MERS-CoV-like virus in camel specimens 
from Saudi Arabia and Qatar [2]. Assuming that MERS-
CoV seropositivity in MNTs, irrespective of the infecting 
virus that leads to such seropositivity, correlates with 
resistance to, or reduced susceptibility to re-infection, 
these results would suggest that the search for virus in 
these animals should be focused on dromedary camels 
<1 year of age. Studies involving follow-up of herds of 
camels from time of calving though the first year of life 
with serial blood samples together with oral and rectal 
or fresh faecal swabs would better define the ecology 
of the MERS-CoV-like virus infecting these animals and 
provide virus for genetic characterisation. Such studies 
are a priority to determine whether dromedary camels 
are in fact a source of human MERS-CoV infection or 
whether they are being infected by a ubiquitous novel 
coronavirus closely related to MERS-CoV. As illustrated 
with SARS a decade ago and avian influenza A(H7N9) 
recently, identification of the animal source and the 
setting within which zoonotic transmission occurs can 
provide options for reducing repeated zoonotic trans-
missions and enhancing global public health. Finally, 
given the high titres of neutralising antibody to MERS 
CoV commonly seen in dromedary camels, serum from 
these animals may provide an option for passive immu-
notherapy of patients with MERS, from whom no spe-
cific antiviral therapy currently exists. 
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Molecular characterisation of measles virus is a pow-
erful tool for tracing transmission. Genotyping may 
prove the absence of endemic circulation of measles 
virus, i.e. transmission for more than 12 months, 
which is one of the criteria for verifying elimination of 
the disease. We have genetically characterised mea-
sles viruses detected in Romania from 2008 to 2012, 
focusing on the recent outbreaks from 2010 to 2012 
that affected mainly groups with limited access to 
healthcare and schools. The findings emphasise the 
importance of genotyping during the different phases 
of an outbreak. A total of 8,170 cases were notified, 
and 5,093 (62%) of the 7,559 possible cases were 
serologically confirmed. RT-PCR was performed for 
104 samples: from the 101 positive samples obtained 
from sporadic measles cases or clusters from different 
counties, 73 were genotyped. Sporadic measles cases 
associated with D4 and D5 viruses were observed from 
2008 to 2009. Genotype D4-Manchester was predomi-
nant in 2011 and 2012. In addition, the related variant 
D4-Maramures and MVs/Limoges.FRA/17.10[D4] and a 
few D4-Hamburg strains were detected. The detection 
of several distinct MV-D4 genotypes suggests multiple 
virus importations to Romania. The outbreak associ-
ated with D4 genotype is the second largest outbreak 
in Romania in less than 10 years.
Introduction
Measles is a highly contagious respiratory viral dis-
ease characterised by the appearance of fever and 
a rash and that can be very serious or even fatal. 
Measles remains one of the leading causes of mortal-
ity in young children although a safe and cost-effective 
vaccine has been available for decades [1]. Although 
improvements have been made to control measles in 
Europe, large-scale outbreaks have recently still been 
observed [2-7]. The World Health Organization (WHO) 
was forced to postpone a number of times the target 
date for measles elimination from the European region, 
most recently to 2015 [8].
Measles has been a statutorily notifiable disease in 
Romania since 1978, and medical practitioners must 
report all clinically possible measles cases to the 
regional public health authorities. The first monova-
lent measles-containing vaccine was introduced in 
1979 into the Romanian vaccination schedule for chil-
dren aged nine to 11 months. The combined measles-
mumps-rubella (MMR) vaccine replaced the monovalent 
measles vaccine in 2004 and was recommended as a 
first dose for children aged 12 to 15 months. The sec-
ond MMR vaccine dose has been recommended since 
October 2005 for children aged six to seven years. In 
the period from 2000 to 2010, the coverage for the first 
dose of measles vaccine was estimated at 95–98% [9]. 
In 2011, measles vaccination coverage for the first dose 
of MMR vaccine was estimated at 84% for children aged 
12 months and 93.2% for those aged 18 months [10].
Romania experienced a measles epidemic that started 
in December 2004 and lasted until early 2007 [11]. More 
than 9,000 cases were detected mostly in non-immu-
nised patients belonging to the Roma ethnic group. 
The outbreak was caused by the strain MVs/Bucharest.
ROM/48.04/2[D4] and variants divergent by two nucle-
otides or less were detected during the period 2004 to 
2006 [11]. Closely related strains were detected from 
2005 to 2007 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Germany, 
Italy, Portugal, Serbia, Spain and Switzerland [11-
12]: outbreaks associated with MVs/Bucharest.
ROM/48.04/2[D4] occurred in 2005 in Germany (223 
cases in Hesse, MVs/Frankfurt.DEU/03.05[D4]) [13] and 
from August 2006 to February 2007 in Spain (over 200 
cases in Catalonia, MVs/Barcelona.SPA/41.06/1[D4]) 
[11].
D4 measles viruses are endemic in India, South-East 
Asia and in South Africa [14]. Outbreaks associated 
with this genotype have been reported since 2007 
from all continents. In Europe, many distinct variants 
descend from D4-Enfield (MVs/Enfield.GBR/14/07) 
which became endemic in the United Kingdom (UK) in 
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2007 [15-17]. The variant D4-Hamburg initiated a trans-
mission chain of 25,000 cases that was detected in 
Europe for a period of more than two years, 2009 to 
2011 [18]. In 2010, the D4 genotype became predomi-
nant in Europe [2].
Genetic characterisation of measles viruses constitutes 
an important part of laboratory surveillance. Molecular 
epidemiology confirms the transmission pathway of 
measles virus, thereby complementing classical epi-
demiology. Moreover, interruption of endemic measles 
virus transmission (i.e. circulation of a certain variant 
for more than 12 months) is an important criterion for 
verification of measles virus elimination in Europe. 
Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish between 
endemic and imported viruses using molecular meth-
ods [16].
This study describes the genetic characterisation of 
measles viruses detected in Romania from 2008 to 
2012, focusing on the recent outbreaks that occurred 
in the country between 2010 and 2012 that affected 
mainly groups with limited access to healthcare facili-
ties and schools. This study underlines the importance 
of measles genotyping during the different phases of 
an outbreak.
Methods
Patients and specimens collection
According to the national strategy of measles surveil-
lance, approved by Romanian MOH, a measles case 
is defined as a person with fever and maculopapu-
lar rash and at least one of the following symptoms: 
cough, coryza, or conjunctivitis. Possible cases are 
persons who met the clinical case definition with no 
epidemiological link to a laboratory-confirmed case. 
Confirmed cases are either laboratory-confirmed (by 
detecting measles IgM antibodies in serum samples, 
virus isolation, a significant rise in measles antibody 
levels, or measles PCR detection in all possible cases) 
or confirmed by the presence of measles case symp-
tomatology and an epidemiological link to a labora-
tory-confirmed case. 
At national level, notifications of measles cases are 
collected and analysed by the National Centre for 
Communicable Diseases Surveillance and Control in 
Bucharest, Romania. Specimens are sent for confirma-
tion to the National Reference Laboratory for Measles 
and Rubella in Cantacuzino Institute, Bucharest, 
Romania.
Figure 1
Quaterly distribution of notified and confirmed measles cases, Romania, 2008–12 (n=8,170)
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Laboratory analysis
Serology
Serum samples were tested for measles-specific IgM 
using Enzygnost Anti-Measles-Virus/IgM according to 
the manufacturer’s instructions (Siemens Healthcare 
Diagnostics Products GmbH). 
RT-PCR and sequencing
Confirmed cases were selected for genotyping from 
new outbreaks (index case and two or three secondary 
cases). All confirmed cases with a history of travel 
abroad during the incubation period (7–21 days) were 
genotyped.
For measles virus genotyping, DNA fragments were 
generated by a nested RT-PCR recommended by 
WHO, which targeted the 450 nt region encoding the 
C-terminus of the nucleoprotein, as described pre-
viously [19], using the QIAGEN OneStep RT PCR Kit 
(QIAGEN, Hilden, Germany). Gel purification was per-
formed with Wizard SV Gel and PCR Clean-Up System 
Table 
Molecular characterisation of wildtype measles viruses and relationship of genotypes and epidemiological activity, Romania, 
2008–12 
Detection period Measles virus strain Measles virus genotype/variant Imported from Epidemiological remarks
March 2008 MVs/Dolj.ROU/13/08/1 D4-Enfield Italy 1 sporadic case in Dolj
April 2008 MVs/Bucharest.ROU/20.08/ MVs/Lucerne.SWI/46.06[D5] Greece 1 sporadic case in Bucharest
August 2009 MVs/Arad.ROU/35.09/1 D4-Hamburg Ireland Small cluster (5 cases) in Arad,
2010:  8 districts affected
February–March MVs/Tulcea.ROU/08.10/ D4-Manchester France Small clusters (5 cases) in Tulcea 
April–May MVs/Timis.ROU/18.10/1 D4-Hamburg Unknown 2 cases in Timis (siblings)
June MVs/Neamt.ROU/26.10/ MVs/Limoges.FRA/17.10/[D4] Unknown Small cluster (3 cases)  in Neamt; 1 case in Timis
August MVs/Neamt.ROU/34.10/ MVs/Limoges.FRA/17.10/[D4] Unknown Nosocomial outbreak (28 cases, 1 death) in Neamt 
September MVs/Vaslui.ROU/39.10/ MVs/Paris.FRA/40.10[G3] France 1 sporadic case in Vaslui,
October 2010–
September 2011 MVs/Maramures.ROU/03.11 D4-Maramures Unknown 615 cases in Maramures
2011: 39 of 41 districts plus Bucharest affected
March MVs/Buzau.ROU/12.11/ D4 Turkey 2 sporadic cases in Buzau
April MVs/Calarasi.ROU/16.11/ B3 Spain 1 sporadic case in Calarasi
October MVs/Tulcea.ROU/41.11/ B3 Unknown 1 sporadic case in Tulcea
November MVs/Buzau.ROU/46.11/ D8 Italy 1 case in Buzau
February–November MVs/Ialomita.ROU/06.11/MVs/Bucuresti.ROU/44.1/1 D4-Manchester Not imported
Galati (25 cases), Sibiu (17),  
Caras-Severin (132),  Arges (2), 
Constanta (190), Giurgiu (20), 
Bucuresti (49), Ialomita (30)
2012: All districts affected
January–June MVs/Ilfov.ROU/01.12/ MVs/Ilfov.ROU/23.12/ D4-Manchester Indigenous
Ilfov (50 cases), Iasi (383), and 
Ialomita (92)
April MVs/Brasov.ROU/14.12/ D4-Maramures Indigenous 62 cases in Brasov
June–July MVs/Gorj.ROU/26.12/ MVs/Olt.ROU/28.12/ D8 - Frankfurt Main Unknown
2 sporadic cases in Gorj and 
neighbouring Olt district
August MVs/Brasov.ROU/35.12/ D4- Maramures Indigenous 16 cases in Brasov
September
MVs/Arges.ROU/36.12/ 
MVs/Olt.ROU/37.12/ D4-Manchester Indigenous 
1 sporadic case in Olt and 
outbreak in Arges (72), 
MVs/Prahova.ROU/37.12/ D8 - Frankfurt Main Unknown 1 sporadic case in Prahova,
October
MVs/Suceava.ROU/41.12/ D8 - Frankfurt Main Not imported 5 sporadic cases (1 death) in different parts of the county
MVs/Suceava.ROU/41.12/3 D4- Manchester Indigenous 1 sporadic case in Suceava
MVs/Brasov.ROU/44.12/
MVs/Dolj.ROU/43.12/ D4- Manchester Indigenous
2 sporadic cases in Brasov 
and Dolj
November MVs/Calarasi.ROU/47.12/ D4- Manchester Indigenous 1 sporadic case in Calarasi,
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Promega (Fitchburg, Wisconsin). Sequencing was 
performed with the second round primers  [19] using 
ABI PRISM BigDye Terminator v3.1 Ready Reaction 
Cycle Sequencing kit (Applied Biosystems Foster City, 
California) on a four-capillary ABI PRISM 3100-Avant 
Genetic Analyzer (Applied Biosystems Foster City, 
California).
Sequence analysis
Sequences were edited manually with BioEdit (ver-
sion 7.0.5; North Carolina State University) and with 
the use of Staden Package [20]. Partial nucleocap-
sid gene sequences were aligned against related 
sequences retrieved from GenBank and MeaNS (http://
www.who-measles.org) databases, using ClustalW [21] 
implemented in BioEdit (version 7.1.3.0) [22]. Starting 
with 2011, the programmes BioEdit and Gap4 have been 
replaced by the commercial programme Sequencer 
(Gene Codes Corporation, Ann Arbor, United States).
Phylogenetic analysis was performed using MEGA (ver-
sion 5) with a neighbour-joining (NJ) algorithm inferred 
with Tamura-Nei parameter for sequence evolution.
Results
Romania experienced a measles epidemic with contin-
uous virus transmission from late 2004 to early 2007. 
In the following years 2008 and 2009, measles activity 
Figure 2
Localisation of different measles virus genotypes and D4 variants and confirmed cases detected in Romania in 2008–12 
(n=73)
For the outbreak dots that do not have a genotype assigned, genotyping was not performed. The genotype label is associated with outbreaks 
dots within the county’s geographical boundary.
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was very low (12 cases in 2008; eight cases in 2009), 
all notified cases were imported by travellers coming 
from other European countries, leading to an incidence 
of less than 0.1 per 100,000 persons. The number of 
measles cases then increased again considerably in 
2010 to 2012, reaching a total of 8,170 notified cases, 
of which 5,093 (62%) have been laboratory-confirmed 
(Figure 1).
From 2010 to 2012, a total of 104 possible cases were 
subjected to measles virus detection by RT-PCR (101 
positive) and 73 were genotyped. The results of these 
investigations are summarised in the Table.
Measles cases in 2008
In March 2008, a sporadic case was notified in Dolj 
county (MVs/Dolj.ROU/13/08/1[D4]). This case was 
imported from Italy and had an identical sequence 
to MVs/Enfield.GBR/14.07[D4]. No secondary 
cases were detected. Another sporadic case was 
detected in Bucharest in April 2008 (MVs/Bucharest.
ROU/20.08[D5]). This virus was imported from Greece 
and had an identical sequence to MVs/Lucerne.
CHE/46.06[D5], the strain that caused a large outbreak 
of more than 4,400 cases in Switzerland between 2006 
and 2009.
Measles cases in 2009
In August 2009, in Arad county, a small cluster of five 
measles cases was laboratory-confirmed by IgM. The 
index case was a child too young to be vaccinated 
returning from Ireland, who infected two other family 
members. One of them was hospitalised and passed 
the infection nosocomially to two additional cases 
in the paediatric ward. Genotyping a specimen from 
one of the secondary cases identified a measles virus 
(MVs/Arad.ROU/35.09/1[D4]) that was closely related 
to MVs/Limoges.FRA/17.10[D4] with a single nucleotide 
mismatch. As a response measure, the National Center 
for Surveillance and Control of Transmissible Diseases 
(CNSCBT) coordinated a supplementary vaccination 
campaign in the neighbouring Arad and Timis districts, 
targeting 1,054 unvaccinated or single-dose vaccinated 
children.
Measles cases in 2010
In 2010, measles activity increased to nine sporadic 
cases in five counties and 185 outbreak-related cases 
from in eight counties. Characteristic in that year was 
the occurrence of outbreaks in different geographic 
areas of the country, in the east (Neamt and Galati with 
31 cases each) and in the north-west (Maramures with 
95 cases) (Figure 2).
The first cluster occurred in February to March, in a 
Roma community from Tulcea county, totalling five 
cases. The index case had travelled to France shortly 
before. Genotyping of the strain isolated from the 
index case revealed MVs/Tulcea.ROU/08.10[D4], iden-
tical over the sequenced fragment to MVs/Manchester.
GBR/10.09[D4] (Figure 3). Variant D4–Manchester had 
circulated since 2008 in the UK and in France (MVs/
Montaigu.FRA/43.08[D4], MVs/Paris.FRA/18.10[D4]).
In May 2010, two cases were confirmed in Timis county, 
in siblings without a recent travel history. The identi-
cal sequences found in these two cases, MVs/Timis.
ROU/18.10/1[D4], differed by one nucleotide from the 
strain that caused the small cluster in the previous 
year (MVs/Arad.ROU/35.09/1[D4]), and were identical 
to D4-Hamburg (Figure 3). 
Two outbreaks were notified in the summer of 2010 in 
Neamt county. The first outbreak occurred in June in a 
Roma community with three confirmed cases. The sec-
ond outbreak started in August as a nosocomial infec-
tion in the paediatric ward of a hospital, resulting in 
28 cases with one infant fatality. The sequences from 
both outbreaks (MVs/Neamt.ROU/26.10[D4] and MVs/
Neamt.ROU/34.10[D4]) were identical to MVs/Limoges.
FRA/17.10[D4] (Figure 3).
In October 2010, several outbreaks were notified in 
Galati, reaching 31 cases by the end of the year. The 
involved sequences (MVs/Galati.ROU/42.10/1[D4]) were 
identical to MVs/Limoges.FRA/17.10[D4], as well as the 
strains from Neamt. Strain MVs/Timis.ROU/50.10/1[D4], 
genotyped from two epidemiologically linked cases 
detected in December 2010 in Timis county, differed by 
two nucleotides.
An imported case was detected in a student who 
travelled from Paris to Vaslui in September 2010. 
Sequencing revealed MVs/Vaslui.ROU.40.10[G3], iden-
tical to the strain MVs/Paris.FRA/47.10[G3] MV which 
circulated in France in 2010, but was also detected in 
Germany, the UK and Spain (Figure 4).
Measles cases in 2011
In 2011, outbreaks expanded to 39 of the 42 counties 
of Romania, reaching 4,163 notified cases (45.9% labo-
ratory-confirmed). Because the epidemic was so large, 
measles virus genotyping and phylogenetic analy-
sis was restricted only to extended outbreaks and to 
imported cases. The majority of genotyped cases were 
associated with D4-Manchester and D4-Maramures 
variants (Figures 2 and 3). The cases were mainly seen 
in the north-western region of Romania, first in the 
Roma communities and subsequently spreading into 
the general population. The Salaj county was most 
affected (incidence: 141.9 per 100,000 population). 
Of the total laboratory-confirmed cases in 2011, 78% 
were not vaccinated. Of these, 16% were younger than 
12 months and thus not eligible for vaccination. As a 
response measure to the growing number of measles 
cases, additional vaccination campaigns were imple-
mented in 2011 that targeted children between the 
ages of seven months and seven years, leading to 
approximately 4,500 vaccinated children. 
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Figure 3
Phylogenetic tree of representative measles MV-D4 strains in relation to Mvs/Enfield.GBR/14.07/D4, Romania, 2008–12 
(n=49)
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GenBank accession numbers: MVi/Galati.ROU/20.11, JX156445; 
MVs/Bucuresti.ROU/19.11/1, JN615582; MVs/Timis.ROU/18.10/1, 
HQ704313; MVs/Arad.ROU/35.09/1, HQ704310; MVs/Tulcea.
ROU/08.10, HQ704312; MVs/Timis.ROU/12.11, JN599040; MVs/
Timis.ROU/11.11, JX841118; MVs/Arad.ROU/10.11/1, JN599037; MVs/
Neamt.ROU/10.11, JN599039; MVs/Bihor.ROU/08.11, JN599033; 
MVs/Ilfov.ROU/08.11, JN599034; MVs/Ialomita.ROU/08.11/2, 
JN599036; MVs/Ilfov.ROU/07.11, JX841117; MVs/Ilfov.ROU/06.11, 
JX841116; MVs/Bihor.ROU/06.11, JX841115; MVs/Maramures.
ROU/03.11, JX841109; MVs/Neamt.ROU/08.11, JX841114; MVs/
Arad.ROU/08.11, JX841113; MVs/Brasov.ROU/14.12/1, JX156442; 
MVs/Brasov.ROU/14.12/2, JX156443; MVs/Ialomita.ROU/08.11, 
JN599035; MVs/Constanta.ROU/19.11/3, JN615580; MVs/Caras-
Severin.ROU/36.11/1, JN873033; MVs/Giurgiu.ROU/26.11/1, 
JN615577; MVs/Sibiu.ROU/12.11/, JN599041; MVs/Ialomita.
ROU/06.11, JX841112; MVs/Neamt.ROU/26.10/1, HQ704314; 
MVs/Neamt.ROU/34.10/1, HQ704315; MVs/Galati.ROU/42.10/1, 
HQ902906; MVs/Bucuresti.ROU/26.11/3, JX841111; MVs/Timis.
ROU/50.10/1, HQ902905; MVs/Arges.ROU/19.11/2, JN615581; MVs/
Timis.ROU/25.11, JN615579; MVs/Bucuresti.ROU/44.11, JQ417670; 
MVs/Bucharest.ROU/48.04/2, AM849093; MVs/Galati.ROU/47.11, 
JQ417669; MVs/Iasi.ROU/12.12, JX157884; MVs/Ialomita.
ROU/13.12, JX156444; MVs/Ilfov.ROU/01.12, JQ809707; MVs/Buzau.
ROU/13.11, JN599042; MVs/Buzau.ROU/12.11, JX841110; Montreal.
CAN/89, U01976; MVs/London.GBR/29.11/3, NA; MVs/Ljubljana.
SVN/26.11, NA; MVs/Paris.FRA/11.11/4, NA; MVs/Lyon.FRA/03.11/, 
NA; MVs/Edinburgh.GBR/20.11/3, NA; MVs/Birmingham.GBR/7.12, 
NA; MVs/Heidelberg.DEU/06.11, NA; MVs/Hamburg.DEU/03.09, 
HQ436108; MVs/Belgrad.SRB/26.10, NA; MVs/Muenchen.
DEU/22.10, HQ704350; MVs/Pyrgos.GRC/08.10/4, HM366144; 
MVs/Vienna.AUT/13.10, HQ704298; MVs/Dublin.IRL/1.10, NA; 
MVs/Paris.FRA/16.11/3, NA; MVs/Marseille.FRA/01.11/2, NA; MVs/
Embrun.FRA/07.11, NA; MVs/Gloucester.GBR/13.10, HM215515; 
MVs/Marseille.FRA/16.11, NA; MVi/Falaise.FRA/16.10, FR671445; 
MVi/Villejuif.FRA/20.10, FR671446; MVs/Belfast.GBR/50.09, 
GU479875; MVs/Enfield.GBR/14.07, EF600554; MVs/Gloucester.
GBR/12.10, HM215515; MVs/Istanbul.TUR/20.10, HM579947; MVs/
Limoges.FRA/17.10, FR671430; MVs/London.GBR/5.09, GU120179; 
MVs/Montaigu.FRA/43.08, GQ428173; MVs/Nantes.FRA/44.08, 
GQ428179; MVs/Paris.FRA/18.10, FR671444; MVs/Poitiers.
FRA/47.08, GQ428172; MVs/Pyrgos.GRC/13.10/3, HM802123; MVs/
Thess.GRE/4.10, HM770085; MVs/Toulouse.FRA/07.10, FR671432; 
MVs/Dolj.ROU/13.08/1, HQ704311; MVs/Arad.ROU/38.07/2, 
HQ704309; MVs/Shumen.BGR/15.09/1, HQ436103; MVs/Plovdiv.
BGR/23.10/1, HQ436106; MVs/Pyrgos.GRC/13.10, HM802123; 
MVs/Manchester.GBR/10.09, GQ370461; MVs/Montpellier.
FRA/17.10, FR671431; MVs/SaintMande.FRA/17.10, FR671435; 
MVi/Bandarlengeh.IRA/07.10/1, HM440228; MVi/Bandarabas.
IRA/05.10/2, HM440227; MVs/Isfahan.IRA/22.10, HQ395674; MVs/
Ilfov.ROU/23.12, JX847792; MVs/Brasov.ROU/35.12, NA; MVs/
Arges.ROU/36.12/2, JX912278; MVs/Arges.ROU/36.12, JX912279; 
MVs/Olt.ROU/37.12, NA; MVs/Calarasi.ROU/40.12, NA; MVs/
Suceava.ROU/43.12/3, KC172854; MVs/Dolj.ROU/43.12/2, NA; MVs/
Dolj.ROU/43.12, NA; MVs/Suceava.ROU/43.12/3, NA; MVs/Brasov.
ROU/44.12, NA; MVs/Calarasi.ROU/47.12, NA.
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Figure 4
Phylogenetic tree of sporadic cases infected with measles virus genotypes G3, B3, D8 and D5 detected in Romania, 2008–12 
(n=13), in relation to reference strains 
Romanian MV strains are highlighted in different colours
GenBank accession numbers: MVs/Tulcea.ROU/41.11, JX847793; MVs/Calarasi.ROU/16.11, JN615583; MVs/Buzau.ROU/46.11, JQ417668; 
New York.USA/94, L46753; Ibadan.NIE/97/1, AJ232203; Manchester.UNK/30.94, AF280803; MVs/Gorj.ROU/26.12, JX497760; MVs/Vaslui.
ROU/39.10, JX497759; Palau.BLA/93, L46758; Bangkok.THA/93/1, AF079555; MVs/Imphal.IND/29.11/2, JQ687144; MVs/SaintMande.FRA/42.10, 
FR848083; MVs/Paris.FRA/47.10, FR848086; MVs/SaintMande.FRA/44.10, FR848084; MVs/Madrid.ESP/39.10, HQ712117; MVs/Bucharest.
ROU/20.08, NA; MVs/Ljubljana.SVN/24.11, NA; MVs/London.GBR/27.11/6, NA; MVs/Lucerne.CHE/46.06, NA; Gresik.INO/17.02, AY184217; 
MVs/Barcelona.ESP/48.10, JF681232; MVs/Barcelona.ESP/3.11, JF681246; MVs/Dresden.DEU/49.10, NA; MVs/Istanbul.TUR/27.12/3,NA; MVs/
Frankfurt-Main.DEU/17.11, NA; MVs/Nuernberg.DEU/24.11, NA; MVs/Muenchen.DEU/20.11, NA; 
MVs/Guildford.GBR/7.12, NA; MVi/Villupuram.IND/03.07, FJ765078; MVs/Georgia.USA/25.12, JX402879; MVs/Olt.ROU/28.12, JX497758; 
MVs/Beitbridge.ZWE/46.10, NA; MVs/Prahova.ROU/37.12, NA; MVs/Suceava.ROU/41.12, JX982115; MVs/Suceava.ROU/43.12/2, KC172853; 
MVs/Suceava.ROU/43.12, KC179763; MVs/Suceava.ROU/44.12/2, NA; MVs/Suceava.ROU/44.12, NA.
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Several outbreaks leading to 520 cases started 
in Maramures county in October 2010 and contin-
ued until September 2011. Genotyped cases from 
these outbreaks revealed a new D4 variant MVs/
Maramures.ROU/03.11[D4], which differed by one 
nucleotide from D4-Manchester. D4–Maramures was 
also detected in 2011 in several other counties: Arad, 
Neamt, Bihor (MVs/Arad.ROU/10.11/1[D4], MVs/Arad.
ROU/10.11/1/2[D4], MVs/Neamt.ROU/10.11[D4], and 
MVs/Bihor.ROU/06.11[D4]) as well as in 2012 in Brasov 
county (MVs/Brasov.ROU/14.12/1[D4] and MVs/Brasov.
ROU/44.12/1[D4]). The new variant D4-Maramures 
was exported in 2011 to Slovenia (MVs/Ljubljana.
SVN/26.11[D4]), France (MVs/Paris.FRA/11.11/4[D4]), 
the UK (MVs/London.GBR/29.11/3[D4]) and the United 
States (US) (MVs/Florida.USA/28.11/1) (Figure 3). 
Several strains diverging by a single nucleotide from 
variant D4–Maramures were detected in Ilfov county: 
MVs/Ilfov.ROU/06.11[D4], MVs/Ilfov.ROU/07.11[D4] and 
MVs/Ilfov.ROU/08.11[D4] as well as in Ialomita county 
(MVs/Ialomita.ROU/08.11/2[D4]). The transmission of 
this divergent strain was interrupted in February 2011.
Besides the epidemic caused by D4-Manchester and 
D4-Maramures, we identified new imported cases: a 
single sporadic case with measles genotype B3 was 
detected in April 2011 in Calarasi county. This case 
(MVs/Calarasi.ROU/16.11[B3]) was a teenager who 
had travelled to Spain. Phylogenetic analysis of this 
case revealed 100% identity with MVs/Barcelona.
ESP/48.10[B3] detected in 2010 to 2011 in Spain 
(Granada, Balearic Islands and Barcelona) (Figure 4). 
This import apparently did not spread further. However, 
another case with an identical sequence (MVs/Tulcea.
ROU/41.11[B3]) was detected 25 weeks later in the 
neighbouring Tulcea county. 
Two sporadic D4 cases were identified in March 
2011 in Buzau county. The index case (MVs/Buzau.
ROU/12.11[D4]) had travelled to Turkey, and an isolate 
from a secondary case (MVs/Buzau.ROU/13.11[D4]) 
revealed a single nucleotide exchange compared to 
strains circulating in 2010 in Iran (MVi/Bandarlengeh.
IRA/07.10/1[D4] (Figure 4). 
Measles virus MV-D8 (MVs/Buzau.ROU/46.11[D8]) was 
also detected in November 2011 in Buzau county in a 
person with no recent travel history. The index case of 
this measles virus importation was not identified, and 
no secondary cases were detected. Phylogenetic analy-
sis of this case revealed close relation with the variant 
D8-Frankfurt Main (Figure 4).
Measles cases in 2012
In 2012, measles activity remained at comparable inten-
sity to the previous year, reaching 4,006 cases (79.3% 
laboratory-confirmed) by the end of year, but the geo-
graphical distribution shifted to the south-eastern 
region of Romania. Of all laboratory-confirmed cases 
in 2012, 84.5% were unvaccinated (26.7% too young 
for vaccination). The most affected age group were chil-
dren younger than one year (incidence: 219/100.000) 
and those between one and four years of age (inci-
dence: 78.6/100.000). The majority of these cases 
were associated with D4-Manchester variant (Figures 2 
and 3). According to the national strategy of measles 
cluster control, vaccination of children aged between 
seven month and seven years continued in 2012, but 
the total number of vaccinations is not available.
Two sporadic measles cases infected with MV-D8 with 
identical sequences were detected in June in Gorj 
county (MVs/Gorj.ROU/26.12[D8]) and in July in the 
neighbouring Olt county, (MVs/Olt.ROU/28.12[D8]). 
These two strains belonged to the variant D8-Frankfurt-
Main (MVs/Frankfurt Main.DEU/17.11[D8]) that was 
detected in Germany between February and June 
(MVs/Muenchen.DEU/20.11[D8] and MVs/Nuernberg.
DEU/24.11[D8]), the UK (MVs/Guildford.GBR/7.12[D8]), 
the US (MVs/Georgia.USA/25.12/ [D8]) and Turkey 
(MVs/Istanbul.TUR/27.12/3[D8]), in 2011 to 2012 (Figure 
4).
A fatal measles case in a young teenager (vaccinated 
with two doses of MMR), registered in secondary 
school without any underlying health problems, was 
recorded in October 2012 in Suceava county. MVs/
Suceava.ROU/41.12[D8] also belonged to D8-Frankfurt-
Main and was identical to MVs/Gorj.ROU/26.12[D8], 
MVs/Olt.ROU/28.12[D8], MVs/Prahova.ROU/37.12[D8] 
and MVs/Suceava.ROU/44.12[D8] (Figure 4). Two cases 
with a single nucleotide difference were identified 
(MVs/Suceava.ROU/43.12/[D8]) (Figure 4). In summary, 
8 MV-D8 cases were identified in 2012, five of them in 
Suceava. 
Discussion
The 20 measles cases notified during 2008 to 
2009 were attributed to MV-D4 and MV-D5 viruses 
imported from neighbouring countries and were not 
passed on to the general population. The situation 
changed with three outbreaks in 2010 in Tulcea and 
Neamt (MVs/Tulcea.ROU/08.10[D4]), (MVs/Neamt.
ROU/26.10[D4]). The outbreak in Tulcea was caused 
by a D4-Manchester variant, whereas the viruses from 
Neamt and Galati (MVs/Neamt.ROU/26.10/1[D4], MVs/
Galati.ROU/42.10/1[D4]) exhibited an amino acid sub-
stitution to D4-Manchester (I469L) that had previously 
been found only in a few French sequences depos-
ited in GenBank (MVs/Toulouse.FRA/07.10[D4], MVs/
Limoges.FRA/17.10[D4]) and in one strain from the UK 
(MVs/Gloucester.GBR/12.10[D4]). This finding makes 
prior undetected circulation of Measles Virus related 
to MVs/Neamt.ROU/26.10/1[D4] in early 2010 unlikely. 
It can be therefore assumed, that the Tulcea cluster 
in early 2010 and the outbreak in Neamt in mid-2010 
were linked to separate importations (Figure 3). The 
two cases from Timis detected in December 2010 (MVs/
Timis.ROU/50.10/1[D4]) had two nucleotide differences 
compared with sequences from the outbreak in Neamt 
and Galati, indicating a different source as well. The 
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strain MVs/Timis.ROU/50.10/1[D4] did have the substi-
tution I469L like the sequences from the outbreak in 
Neamt, but shared two additional nucleotide changes 
with the strains circulating in France and the UK. The 
cases from the Timis and Neamt outbreaks may have 
been introduced from different sources but their 
genetic sequences indicate a similar origin.
The variant D4-Manchester was imported in early 2010 
and caused a small outbreak in Tulcea (MVs/Tulcea.
ROU/08.10[D4]), but was apparently re-imported in early 
2011 to Ialomita (MVs/Ialomita.ROU/06.11[D4]) and was 
detected as late as November 2012. Genotyped viruses 
in 2011 to 2012 from outbreaks in a wide geographi-
cal distribution (Ialomita, Sibiu, Arges, Constanta, 
Timis, Giurgiu, Caras-Severin  Bucuresti, Galati, Ilfov, 
and Iasi, the latter with a single nucleotide mismatch) 
were identical to MVs/Tulcea.ROU/08.10[D4] (Figures 2 
and 3). There is no indication of continuous circulation 
of D4-Manchester during the period between February 
2010 and February 2011; our results suggest that it was 
imported for the second time in early 2011. However, 
it is possible that some measles cases went unnoticed 
clinically, some time after February 2010 and before 
February 2011, making the time window in which 
D4-Manchester did not circulate shorter than indicated 
by our data. Variant D4-Manchester apparently co-
circulated with D4-Maramures in 2011 (D4-Manchester 
mainly in the south-east and D4-Maramures in western 
and central Romania) but became predominant in 2012.
Variant D4-Maramures was widely detected in 2011 and 
last in October 2012 in Brasov county. Because of their 
phylogenetic relationship and local and temporal dis-
tribution, it can be assumed that D4-Maramures and 
MVs/Ilfov.ROU/06.11[D4] represent first- and second-
generation descendants of D4-Manchester. Thus, the 
total number of measles cases attributed to the main 
transmission chain had reached at least 7,300 noti-
fied cases by the end of 2012. We could demonstrate 
the establishment of D4-Manchester and its descend-
ants as new endemic strains in Romania, circulating 
continuously for a time period of almost two years 
(February 2011 to November 2012). The outbreak from 
2011 to 2012 associated with D4-Manchester is the sec-
ond large outbreak of D4 genotype in Romania within a 
period of less than 10 years.
In response to the measles outbreaks, a wide range 
of control measures were implemented, including 
strengthened surveillance for timely identification and 
monitoring of cases and outbreaks, modified immu-
nisation schedules, and supplementary immunisa-
tion activities (approximately 4,500 vaccinated) of the 
rural population. Despite these measures, more than 
4,000 of the over 30,000 cases recorded in Europe in 
2011 were from Romania [23]. In 2012, 3,843 of 8,230 
total cases were reported by Romania to The European 
Surveillance System [24].
Frequent measles outbreaks in Romania could be 
the result of suboptimal vaccine coverage. In 2009, 
the coverage for the first dose of measles-containing 
vaccine in children aged 12 months was estimated at 
85.1% (95% confidence interval (CI): 82.4–87.8), but 
reached the target of 95% (95% CI: 93.4–95.8) in chil-
dren aged 18 months [25]. Despite this fairly high vac-
cination coverage in the 18 month-olds, it is of note 
that families not registered with a family physician 
are not represented in this analysis. Lately a shrink-
ing confidence in vaccination has been observed in 
Romania, reflecting the progress of the anti-vaccine 
movement all over Europe. The ethnic group of the 
Roma is traditionally underserved by national health 
services and moreover, a part of them refuse vaccina-
tion actively. The current and previous Romanian out-
breaks started in Roma communities and underline 
the need to develop strategies to improve their inte-
gration into the national health services. However, we 
want to make clear that any under-vaccinated groups 
or those with a low immunity rate are highly prone to 
measles virus infections, and represent an important 
factor preventing successful and sustainable elimina-
tion of measles in Romania. Our results underline the 
importance to strengthen immunisation programmes 
and to develop specific measures to address parents 
and their concerns regarding vaccination as well as the 
hard-to-reach population all over Europe. 
In conclusion, a combination of epidemiological data 
and molecular characterisation enabled us to trace 
the spread of wild measles virus genotype in Romania 
from 2008 to 2012. Molecular surveillance of measles 
virus circulation in Romania will be continued to assess 
the effectiveness of the national measles control pro-
gramme and hopefully to support the verification of 
measles elimination by the year 2015.
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The novel avian influenza A(H7N9) infection has 
recently emerged to cause severe respiratory illness 
in China. The objectives of this study were to define 
the kinetics of the antibody responses in patients 
with influenza A(H7N9) disease and to correlate these 
kinetics with clinical outcome. Serial serum samples 
were obtained at intervals of three to four days from 
18 patients with virologically confirmed A(H7N9) dis-
ease in Shanghai. We determined the kinetics of the 
haemagglutination inhibition (HI) and A(H7H9) pseu-
dotype neutralisation antibody (Nab) responses and 
correlated these with clinical outcomes. Most patients 
had robust serological responses by both HI and Nab 
tests. Taking into account censoring due to time of 
testing and death, the median time from onset of ill-
ness to Nab titre ≥1:40 was 14 days (95% confidence 
interval (CI): 11–18 days) in the fatal cases and 10.5 
days (95% CI: 7–12) in the survivors (p=0.003). The 
two groups did not differ in initial Nab titres, but the 
rate of increase in Nab titres was significantly faster 
for survivors by approximately 10-fold per 15 days 
(p=0.007). Early and rapid induction of Nab was cor-
related significantly with better clinical outcome.
Introduction 
A novel avian influenza A(H7N9) infection emerged to 
cause an outbreak in the Yangtze River delta in early 
2013, subsequently spreading to other provinces in 
China [1-4]. In the first wave of influenza A(H7N9) 
infections from February to July 2013, 135 patients 
were reported from 11 provinces and municipalities 
in China, leading to 45 deaths [5]. Further cases have 
been reported since October 2013. Genomic analysis 
revealed that the novel H7 haemagglutinin is genetically 
distinct from other historical and contemporary human 
influenza viruses [3,6]. Adverse clinical outcomes have 
been associated with co-existing medical conditions 
or the development of drug resistance [7,8]. Previous 
H7 subtype influenza virus infections in humans such 
as the influenza A(H7N7) outbreak in Netherlands in 
2003 were poorly immunogenic and serodiagnosis and 
seroepidemiology were challenging [9]. We explored 
the kinetics of the serological responses to this novel 
virus in haemagglutination inhibition (HI) assays and 
in a recently developed H7N9 pseudotype virus particle 
neutralisation (Nab) test [10]. Viral pseudotypes have 
been previously shown to provide reliable correlation 
with conventional microneutralisation tests for influ-
enza A(H5N1) serological studies [11]. We investigated 
correlations between serological responses and clini-
cal outcome. 
Methods
Patients and samples
In April 2013, 18 patients confirmed with influenza 
A(H7N9) infection by real-time PCR were hospitalised at 
the Shanghai Public Health Clinical Center (SHAPHC). 
Serum specimens were collected every three to four 
days following admission with two to seven serial 
serum samples being collected from each patient. 
Clinical data including patient demographic informa-
tion, treatment, clinical investigations and disease pro-
gression were retrieved from the clinical notes. Written 
informed consent was obtained from all participants. 
The overall study was reviewed and approved by the 
Ethics Committee of SHAPHC. 
Haemagglutination inhibition assay
The methods used were as previously described and 
used horse erythrocytes [12]. Serum samples were 
treated with receptor-destroying enzyme (RDE) (Denka 
Seiken Co Ltd., Tokyo, Japan) to remove non-specific 
inhibitors. Stored serum samples collected in 2009 
from individuals not infected with influenza were used 
as negative serum controls. The virus strain used was 
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A/Shanghai/4664T/2013 (H7N9) (GenBank accession 
No: KC853228.1). 
Pseudovirus-based neutralisation assay
To rapidly and safely assess neutralisation activities 
against the 2013 influenza A(H7N9) virus which caused 
severe disease in humans, we developed a luciferase 
reporter-based Nab assay which has a non-replicative 
human immunodeficiency virus backbone carrying 
influenza A H7 and H9. We have previously demon-
strated that the titres quantified by Nab assay corre-
lated well with the titres measured by traditional HI 
assay, using serum samples from influenza A(H7N9)-
infected patients and uninfected subjects with good 
correlation (Spearman r=0.88) [10]. The pseudoviruses 
were prepared as described in our previous report 
[10]. The neutralising titre of human sera was defined 
as the highest serum dilution that gave ≥80% inhibi-
tory concentration (IC80) of the luciferase signal in 
virus-infected MDCK cells. On the basis of previous 
studies we had defined that IC80 and a antibody titre 
of 1:40 were the best discriminators between patients 
and non-infected controls, and we employed these to 
define positive Nab responses. 
Statistical analyses 
Non-parametric Mann–Whitney test was used to test 
the differences in HI or Nab titres across groups. 
Categorical variables were compared by using the two-
tailed Fisher’s exact test to account for small sample 
size. In addition, univariate and multivariate exact 
logistic regression modelling were employed to iden-
tify the association of different factors with clinical 
outcome and allow for small cell size. The covariates 
used in the multivariate model included age, sex and 
NAb titres (1:40 and 1:640). The results were presented 
using odds ratios (ORs). 
We fitted accelerated failure time model assuming a 
Gaussian distribution to compare time from illness 
onset to reaching a Nab titre of 1:40 between patients 
who recovered versus those who died, accounting for 
interval censoring due to time of testing. The model 
was also used to identify factors associated with longer 
time to recovery for recovered patients. We compared 
the initial Nab titre and rate of increase in Nab titre, 
adjusted for age and sex, using a linear mixed model to 
account for repeated measurements, assuming a linear 
increasing trend by days since illness onset. For analy-
ses based on continuous measurements, titres were 
first log-transformed (with base 10). We used bootstrap 
method with 1,000 resamples to test the difference in 
time from illness onset to reaching a Nab titre of 1:40 
between fatal cases and survivors. All statistical tests 
were considered significant at the level of p<0.05. All 
data were analysed by using SPSS software (version 
17.0) and R (version 3.0.1).
Results
To understand the kinetics of the human serological 
responses to the novel influenza A(H7N9) virus, we 
first determined (HI) antibody and pseudotype Nab 
responses in 18 influenza A(H7N9)-infected patients. 
HI antibody titres reached a titre of 1:40 in six of 14 
patients by Day 10 of illness. By Day 18 of illness, 17 of 
18 patients had antibody titres of 1:40 with titres rang-
ing from <1:10 to 1:320, and 10 of 18 patients had titres 
≥1:80. All patients had evidence of seroconversion 
within three weeks (Figure). We next examined Nab 
titres quantified by the Nab assay. Nab titres reached 
1:40 in five of 14 patients by Day 10 of illness and 16 of 
17 by Day 18 of illness. Thirty-seven control sera col-
lected in 2009 had negative results in both tests. To 
test the reliability of assays, limited repeat testing has 
been done on sets of sera by both assays with good 
reproducibility; in addition, all the sera were tested in 
one large assay batch to maintain comparability.
We examined the association between HI and Nab 
responses with clinical outcomes. The 18 patients 
were divided into two groups: group A were 12 patients 
who recovered and group B were six patients who had 
died (Table 1). The differences in HI titres between the 
two groups were not statistically significant. We next 
examined the development of Nab in the two patient 
groups, taking into account censoring due to time of 
testing and death. The median time from symptom 
onset to Nab titres reaching 1:40 was 10.5 days (95% 
confidence interval (CI): 7–12 days) for patients who 
survived and 14.0 days (95% CI: 11–18 days) for those 
who died. In patients who survived, it took a signifi-
cantly shorter time to reach Nab titres of 1:40 for the 
unadjusted model (p<0.001) and the model adjusted 
for age and sex (p<0.001). Adjusted for age and sex, 
there was no significant difference (p=0.36) in the ini-
tial Nab titre between patients who survived and those 
who died. However, the Nab titre for survived patients 
increased significantly faster than for patients who 
eventually died, by approximately 10-fold per 15 days 
(p=0.007). The difference persisted when we restricted 
the analysis to patients with low initial Nab titres (≤1:40 
on day 10, p=0.003).
We further examined the association between clinical 
outcome and sex, age, underlying medical disorders, 
timing for initiating antiviral treatment with oseltami-
vir or anti-inflammatory treatment with methylpred-
nisolone and initial viral loads. None of these factors 
were significantly associated with clinical outcomes in 
the univariate analysis (Table 2). Nab titres reaching 
≥1:640 or reaching 1:40 within 14 days were associated 
with survival in both univariate and multivariate analy-
sis (Table 2). However, HI titres reaching 1:40 within 10 
days were not associated with survival.
We also examined the association of these different 
factors with time to recovery in the survivors. Reaching 
Nab titres 1:640 within 14 days after illness onset was 
significantly associated with faster recovery (p=0.002) 
in the univariate analysis (Table 3). After adjusting for 
other confounding factors, it was associated with a 
22% shorter recovery time, although the effect was not 
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Figure
Antibody responses in influenza A (H7N9) patients after illness onset, China, 2013 (n=18)
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Serum samples were collected from all 18 influenza A(H7N9)-infected patients. For each patient, two to seven serial serum samples at 
intervals of three to four days were collected after their admission to our center. The population level kinetics of both (A) HI and (B) 
neutralisation antibody responses of each individual patient are shown over time. HI titres were not significantly different between 
survivors and fatal cases at eight to 10 days (p=0.126) and at 11 to 14 days (p=0.390) after illness onset.
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statistically significant (p=0.108). Only age and time 
until oseltamivir treatment remained significant in the 
multivariate analysis (Table 3). 
To specifically examine whether use of methyl predni-
solone had an impact on antibody responses, we fitted 
a linear mixed model including ‘initiation of methyl-
prednisolone treatment less than eight days after dis-
ease onset’ as a variable to predict trends in HI and 
Nab titres. Adjusted for age and sex, receiving methyl-
prednisolone treatment within eight days did not have 
a significant influence on HI and Nab titres.
Discussion
The kinetics of the antibody responses in human 
A(H7N9) virus infections remain ill defined. Such data 
are important for serodiagnostic purposes as well as 
for the interpretation of seroepidemiological studies. 
Our findings indicate that influenza A(H7N9) infec-
tions are associated with generally robust HI antibody 
responses and, with one exception (Patient 9, a patient 
who died), Nab antibody responses. Therefore, sero-
diagnosis of hospitalised patients should not pose 
a major challenge, unlike human H7N7 infections in 
the Netherlands in 2003 [9]. It is relevant to note that 
Table 1
Viral loads and clinical outcomes in influenza A (H7N9)-infected patients, China, 2013 (n=18)
Patient 
number Sex Age
Underlying medical 
disorders
Time between onset of symptoms 
and Initial  viral 
loads
(copies/mL)
Clinical 
outcome
the initiation 
of oseltamivir 
treatment   
(days)
first treatment with 
methylprednisolone 
(days) 
Discharged 
after days 
of onset or 
death
Group A:
recovered
11 M 53 None 5 5 6.59x102 14
14 M 47 None 5 5 9.30x103 17
7 M 68 Hypertension II 6 No 1.29x103 18
8 M 65 Hypertension, urethritis 4 No 3.49x102 18
17 F 74
Hypertension III, coronary 
heart disease (NYHA IV), 
diabetes II, cholecystitis
8 No 5.11x103 21
12 M 74 None 8 12 3.68x102 22
2 F 81 Arrhythmia 5 6 3.08x103 23
3 M 67 None 5 4 4.24x103 23
18 M 67 Diabetes II 11 9 3.86x102 24
10 M 78 Hypertension II 11 15 2.28x102 31
5 F 75
Hypertension II, coronary 
heart disease (NYHA IV), 
diabetes 
8 9 1.13x103 33
4 M 62 Hypertension 9 5 5.70x105 35
Group Ba:
died
16 F 79
Arrhythmia, coronary 
heart disease (NYHA 
IV), chronic bronchitis. 
primary biliary cirrhosis
6 6 5.65x104 Death
1 M 56 None 3 7 2.67x102 Death
6 M 58 Hypertension 9 8 Negative Death
13 M 88
Hypertension III, coronary 
heart disease (NYHA 
IV), diabetes II, chronic 
bronchitis
7 8 4.06x104   Death
15 M 80 None 7 7 5.8x103 Death
9 M 74 Coronary heart disease (NYHA III) 6 6 Negative  Death
F: female; M: male; NYHA: New York Heart Association Functional Classification.
a  The virus isolates in patients 13 and 1 developed the Arg292Lys mutation in the neuraminidase protein, which is known to confer resistance 
to oseltamivir. 
Patients are listed by date of discharge from our hospital.
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nearly all diagnosed H7N9-infected patients had more 
severe disease (namely pneumonia) compared with the 
outbreak in the Netherlands, where diagnosed patients 
had mainly mild conjunctivitis or influenza-like illness. 
Thus, one cannot be certain that milder or asympto-
matic influenza A(H7N9) infections would manifest 
comparably robust serological responses. In addition, 
this has to be kept in mind when interpreting commu-
nity-wide seroepidemiological studies. It would be 
interesting to have serological data from family mem-
bers and contacts of our patients. Unfortunately, such 
a follow-up study was not conducted. 
The progression of influenza A(H7N9) disease was 
observed to be slower than of influenza A(H5N1) dis-
ease, the median time from hospitalisation to death 
being 12.0 days and 5.7 days, respectively [13]. We 
hypothesised that the prolonged disease course of 
H7N9 compared with H5N1 influenza (and SARS-CoV) 
infection is likely to imply that there is more opportu-
nity for the adaptive immune response to contribute 
to recovery and survival. Therefore, we examined the 
antibody responses with HI and Nab assays in influ-
enza A(H7N9)-infected patients admitted into our clini-
cal center. We evaluated the correlation between the 
kinetics of HI and Nab antibody responses and clinical 
Table 2
Association of different factors with clinical outcomes in influenza A (H7N9)-infected patients, China, 2013 (n=18) 
Variables Dischargen (%)
Death 
n (%)
Univariate analysis Multivariate analysis
ORa (95% CI) p value ORa (95% CI) p value
Sex
Male 9 (64.3) 5 (35.7) 1 – –  –
Female 3 (75.0) 1 (25.0) 1.62   (0.096-105) 1 –  –
Age
<75 years 9 (75.0) 3 (25.0) 1 – –  –
≥75 years 3 (50.0) 3 (50.0) 0.344   (0.027–4.17) 0.356 –  –
Medical disorders
No 4 (44.7) 2 (33.3) 1 – –  –
Yes 8 (66.7) 4 (33.3) 1.00   (0.064–11.5) 1 –  –
Initiation of oseltamivir treatment
<8 days 6 (54.5) 5 (45.5) 1 – –  –
≥8 days 6 (85.7) 1 (14.3) 4.59  (0.346–275) 0.316 –  –
Initiation of methylprednisolone treatment
<8 days 5 (55.6) 4 (44.4) 1 – –  –
≥8 days 7 (77.8) 2 (22.2) 2.64  (0.253–40.5) 0.620 –  –
First viral load
<1,000 copies/mL 5 (62.5) 3 (37.5) 1 – –  –
≥1,000 copies/mL 7 (70.0) 3 (30.0) 1.37  (0.126–15.2) 1 –  –
Nab titre reaches 1:640
No 1 (16.7) 5 (83.3) 1 – 1 –
Yes 11 (91.7) 1 (8.3) 35.4 (1.99–2740) 0.004 16.9 (2.19–220) 0.006
Nab titre reaches 1:40
≤14 days 11 (84.6) 2 (15.4) 1 – 1 –
>14 days 1 (20.0) 4 (80.0) 0.0587 (0.000858–0.941) 0.022
0.0361 
(0.000–0.519) 0.011
HI titre reaches 1:40b
≤10 days 5 (62.5) 3 (37.5) 1 – –  –
>10 days 7 (70.0) 3 (30.0) 1.37 (0.126–15.2) 1 –  –
–, not relevant; CI: confidence interval; HI: haemagglutination inhibition; Nab: pseudotype neutralisation antibody; OR: odds ratio. 
a  OR>1 indicates ‘preferring recovery’. Multivariate analyses were performed by examining whether Nab titres reached 1:640 or 1:40 within 14 
days in a model with co-factors of age and sex.
b  Missing HI titres within 10 days were imputed conservatively in such a way that would attenuate the results toward the null hypothesis.
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disease outcome of survival or death. Strikingly, we 
observed that the early and rapid induction of Nab 
significantly correlated with the rapid recovery from 
illness. The two groups of patients did not differ in ini-
tial Nab antibody titres, but the rate of antibody titre 
increase was approximately 10-fold faster per 15 days 
in survivors than in fatal cases (p=0.007). In contrast, 
no significant association was observed between HI 
titres and clinical outcomes. While the HI test only 
detects antibodies against the receptor-binding domain 
of the globular head of the haemagglutinin, neutralisa-
tion could be conferred by antibodies against the stalk 
of the haemagglutinin as well as the neuraminidase. 
Therefore, it is possible that neutralisation and HI anti-
bodies may differ in their capacity to control influenza 
infection, and Nab may represent a better early surro-
gate marker for recovery from H7N9 influenza disease. 
In those who survived the infection, reaching Nab titres 
of ≥1:640 within 14 days of illness was associated with 
a trend toward faster recovery. Interestingly, while age 
and time to oseltamivir treatment were not significantly 
associated with survival in the group overall, they were 
associated with faster recovery in the survivors. This 
Table 3
The association of different factors with time to recovery for recovered patients
Variables
Median time 
to recovery 
(days)
Univariate analysis Multivariate analysis
AFa (95% CI) p value AFb (95% CI) p value
Sex
Male 22.0 1 1
Female 23.0 1.17 (0.831–1.64) 0.374 0.893 (0.709–1.12) 0.332
Age
<75 years 21.0 1 1
≥75 years 31.0 1.39 (1.03–1.86) 0.031 1.32 (1.05–1.66) 0.019
Medical disorders
No 19.5 1 1
Yes 23.5 1.32 (0.999–1.75) 0.051 0.994 (0.795–1.24) 0.960
Initiation of oseltamivir treatment
<8 days 18.0 1 1
≥8 days 27.5 1.46 (1.18–1.81) <0.001 1.31 (1.11–1.56) 0.002
Initiation of methylprednisolone treatment
<8 days 23.0 1 – –
≥8 days 22.0 1.09 (0.806–1.48) 0.575 – –
First viral load
<1 000 22.0 1 – –
≥1 000 23.0 1.12 (0.826–1.51) 0.476 – –
Nab titre reaches 1:640
>21 days or not reaching 1:640 23.5 1 – –
15–21 days 20.0 0.878 (0.681–1.13) 0.312 0.996 (0.803-1.23) 0.968
≤14 days 15.5 0.606 (0.440–0.835) 0.002 0.784 (0.584-1.05) 0.108
Nab titre reaches 1:40
≤14 days 22.0 1 – –
>14 days 23.0 1.03 (0.595–1.78) 0.922 – –
HI titre reaches 1:40b
≤10 days 24.0 1 – –
>10 days 22.0 0.88 (0.655–1.191) 0.415 – –
–, not relevant; CI: confidence interval; HI: haemagglutination inhibition; Nab: pseudotype neutralisation antibody; AF: acceleration factor.
a  AF<1 indicates reduction in time from illness onset to recovery. Multivariate analyses were performed by examining medical disorder, 
initiation of oseltamivir treatment after eight days and time to reach Nab titres 1:640, in a model with co-factors of age and sex.
b  Missing HI titres within 10 days were imputed conservatively in such a way that would attenuate the results toward the null hypothesis.
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difference may be related to the finding that emer-
gence of oseltamivir resistance was associated with 
adverse clinical outcome in at least two of our patients 
with fatal outcome [8]. Another recent study reported 
association between faster serological responses and 
survival in H7N9 influenza patients, although it did not 
account for censoring due to time of testing and death, 
nor investigate the role of other confounding factors 
such as corticosteroid therapy or antiviral therapy [17]. 
Antibodies use different mechanisms to contain virus 
infection, including direct neutralisation of virus entry, 
antibody-dependent cytotoxic responses and directing 
presentation of virus–antibody complexes to antigen-
presenting cells [14]. It is also possible that the early 
development of Nab antibodies and the rapid involve-
ment of Nab antibodies in responding to influenza 
virus infection may alter the innate immune response 
and thereby result in a milder disease course. Previous 
reports have demonstrated that severe clinical disease 
in highly pathogenic avian influenza infection was usu-
ally associated with skewed innate immune responses 
which were characterised by the production of more 
pro-inflammatory cytokines and less type I interferon, 
whereas a mild influenza disease course was associ-
ated with a balanced type I interferon and inflamma-
tory response [15,16]. An alternative explanation is that 
the antibody responses are a surrogate marker for cell-
mediated immune responses. 
In summary, our data demonstrate that the haemag-
glutinin of the 2013 A(H7N9) influenza virus is immuno-
genic and capable of rapidly eliciting robust HI and Nab 
antibody responses. The kinetics of the Nab response 
are correlated with clinical outcome. Cause and effect 
cannot yet be established because antibody responses 
may be a confounding factor associated with other pro-
tective determinants of clinical outcome. Convalescent 
plasma therapy has previously been shown to reduce 
mortality in patients in intensive care with pandemic 
H1N1 influenza [18]. Thus, our data may indicate that 
early passive antibody therapy may be beneficial to 
clinical outcome, especially in those who fail to mount 
rapid Nab antibody responses.
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In several European countries, diagnosis of 
nephropathia epidemica, a mild form of haemorrhagic 
fever with renal syndrome (HFRS) caused by Puumala-
virus infection, has increased over the past 10–20 
years. In Switzerland, despite its geographical prox-
imity to regions with epidemic outbreaks in Germany 
and France, infections are detected only sporadically. 
To estimate the actual prevalence and potential risk 
factors of human hantavirus infections in Switzerland, 
a seroepidemiological study was performed in 2009 
on serum samples from 4,559 blood donors and 1,810 
military personnel. Sera were screened using commer-
cial Puumala IgG and hantavirus IgG enzyme-linked 
immunosorbent assays indicating a seroprevalence 
of 1% and 9%, respectively. Subsequently, the sam-
ples were analysed by immunofluorescence assay and 
immunoblot assay, showing a much lower prevalence, 
of 0.4% and 0.3%, respectively. Two of the serum sam-
ples achieved an 80% reduction in plaque-forming 
units in a neutralisation test. Statistical evaluation of 
questionnaires only identified an association of age 
(above 50 years) with hantavirus seropositivity when 
adjusted for sex (odds ratio: 2.36; 95% confidence 
interval: 1.10–5.05). This study provides baseline data 
(0.3–0.4%) for future monitoring of hantavirus sero-
prevalence in Switzerland and highlights the chal-
lenges in estimating the seroprevalence of these 
viruses in a country with very low endemicity.
Introduction 
At present, the genus Hantavirus includes over 20 
viruses, which are mainly transmitted from rodents 
to humans via aerosols. Hantaviruses cause haemor-
rhagic fever with renal syndrome (HFRS) and hantavi-
rus pulmonary syndrome (HPS) and are responsible 
for the annual hospitalisation of 150,000 to 200,000 
patients worldwide [1,2]. Hantaviruses are predomi-
nantly present in distinct regions of Asia, Europe and 
America. In Europe, the hantavirus species Puumala 
virus (PUUV), Dobrava virus (DOBV) and Seoul virus 
(SEOV) cause HFRS in humans. These viruses differ in 
their geographical distribution and course of infection. 
PUUV is predominantly present in the European region 
of Russia (7,000 cases per year), Scandinavia (1,000–
3,000 cases per year) and central Europe (300–3,000 
cases per year) and to a lesser extent in the eastern 
part of Europe (Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, Serbia) 
[3-5]. PUUV causes nephropathia epidemica (NE), a 
mild form of HFRS, which is generally not associated 
with major haemorrhagic symptoms and has a low 
case fatality rate of approximately 0.4% [6]. In the 
Balkan Peninsula, DOBV causes HFRS, with a case 
fatality rate of 9–12% [7]. Saaremaa virus (SAAV), first 
isolated in Estonia and found also in Russia, Slovenia 
and Germany, is genetically closely related to DOBV 
but causes a mild form of HFRS [8,9]. Although other 
hantaviruses have been isolated in Germany, hantavi-
rus infections in central Europe are generally caused 
by PUUV [10,11].
An increase in HFRS due to PUUV infection was observed 
in 2005, 2007 and 2010 in distinct regions of Belgium, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, France and Germany [4]. 
Some of the most affected regions were located close 
to the Swiss border [11,12]. While Italy, which shares 
a border with the south of Switzerland, reported no 
cases of hantavirus infection between 2005 and 2010 
[4], in Austria, a country neighbouring Switzerland to 
the east, moderate numbers of PUUV infections were 
reported until 2011, with an increase in the number of 
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human cases in 2012 in provinces bordering Slovenia 
[13]. Despite the proximity of Switzerland to endemic 
regions in Germany and France, only one case was 
reported here between 1988 and 2003 (Nicole Gysin, 
Federal Office of Public Health, personnal communi-
cation, 11 December 2013) and a few HFRS patients 
(between 0 and 4 cases per year) were documented 
in Switzerland between 2003 and 2011 [14]. However, 
as the majority (90–95%) of PUUV infections remain 
subclinical [15] and symptomatic infections may easily 
be overlooked, due to lack of awareness among Swiss 
clinicians, the actual number of hantavirus infections 
may be underestimated in Switzerland. 
IgG antibodies produced in response to hantavirus 
infection persist for 20 years or more [16]. Hence, 
serological studies can be used to determine the pro-
portion of a population that has been infected with 
hantaviruses. In European countries where infections 
with hantaviruses are common, the IgG seroprevalence 
ranges from 1% to 9% [1-3]. In Germany, the average 
seroprevalence was estimated at 1–2% in 1995, but 
Figure 1
Location of blood sampling sites and place of residence of blood donors with positive hantavirus serology, Switzerland, 2009 
Blood samples were collected from 16 military bases throughout Switzerland by a field team of the University of Zurich/ Institute of Social 
and Preventive Medicine, Division of Communicable Diseases and from 114 locations by mobile teams of the Blood Transfusion Service of the 
Swiss Red Cross Berne. 
Place of residence of blood donors with positive hantavirus serology (positive enzyme-linked immunofluorescence assay screening followed 
by either a positive immunofluorescence assay and/or a positive or questionable immunoblot assay) is indicated. Dark-grey lines indicate 
borders; rivers and lakes are depicted in blue.
Map adapted from: http://d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=2648&lang=en
Military base sampled (n=16)
Mobile unit of the Blood Transfusion Service of the Swiss Red Cross Berne sampling place (n=114) 
Place of residence of blood donors with positive hantavirus serology (n=24)
30 km
  
 
 
Italy
Austria
Germany
France
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was much higher in 2005 in epidemic areas such as 
Baden Württemberg and Lower Bavaria (about 7%) [17-
19]. A regional and smaller serological study performed 
in the north-eastern part of Switzerland in 2002–03 
indicated that the hantavirus seroprevalence in local 
blood donors was in the range of 0.5%, with compa-
rable results in selected risk groups such as forestry 
workers and farmers [20]. A higher seroprevalence was 
observed among young soldiers tested during their 
military service (1.9%; 2/103), but the sample size was 
small and the difference was not statistically signifi-
cant [20]. 
Our study aims were threefold: firstly, to estimate the 
actual PUUV seroprevalence in blood donors in cen-
tral Switzerland, to provide baseline data for surveil-
lance; secondly, to determine whether there would be 
a statistically significant difference between the sero-
prevalence in army personnel and blood donors when 
the sample size is larger; and thirdly, to generate evi-
dence to increase awareness and preparedness given 
the cyclical epidemic situations in our neighbouring 
countries. 
We performed a sample size determination based on 
previous seroprevalence data for Switzerland [20] 
and Swiss military personnel and blood donors were 
selected as study populations. Since it is difficult to 
assess the seroprevalence in a country with low ende-
micity, we combined the high sensitivity of two ELISAs 
used for screening with the specificity provided by 
immunofluorescence, immunoblot and neutralisation 
assays to confirm the positive sera. 
Methods
Study population, data collection 
and selection criteria
During 2009, a prospective questionnaire-based sero-
prevalence study was performed in Switzerland. The 
study protocol was approved by the relevant cantonal 
ethical boards. To be enrolled, adults (>18 years) had 
to be German-, French- or Italian-speaking Swiss resi-
dents and either soldiers of the Swiss Armed Forces 
during their military service or registered blood donors. 
We selected 16 military bases on the basis of their loca-
tion throughout Switzerland. All soldiers at the bases, 
who resided all over the country, were invited to par-
ticipate in the study. Participation was voluntary. All 
soldiers were informed orally about the study, asked 
to give their written consent and to complete a struc-
tured questionnaire on the military base before they 
provided a single blood sample. 
All blood donors registered with mobile teams of the 
Blood Transfusion Service of the Swiss Red Cross Berne 
received information about the study, the question-
naire and the consent form by post and were asked to 
take the completed forms to their next blood-donation 
session, if willing to participate. Samples and forms 
from registered blood donors were collected in 114 
locations within the cantons of Berne and Lucerne and 
in central Switzerland (Figure 1). Sera were taken dur-
ing the regular blood donation organised by the mobile 
teams and uncertainties concerning the questionnaire 
or study were clarified on site. Testing blood samples 
obtained by the mobile teams ensured that donors liv-
ing in rural areas were included, as the teams visit vil-
lages outside urban areas.
Potential risk and confounding factors, such as place 
and location of residence, demographics, occupational 
and leisure activities, self-perceived current health 
status, relevant symptoms, smoking history, comor-
bidities and travel history in the past two years were 
assessed with the questionnaire. 
Serological screening
All sera were screened for hantavirus-specific IgG using 
commercially available ELISAs. Sera were first ana-
lysed with the Hantavirus IgG DxSelect ELISA (Focus, 
Cypress, USA) then with Hantavirus Puumala IgG/IgM 
ELISA (Progen Biotechnical, Heidelberg, Germany).
Immunofluorescence assay
Serum samples that tested positive with at least one 
of the ELISA tests were further analysed by immuno-
fluorescence assay (IFA) using the Euroimmun Anti-
Hantavirus-IIFT Mosaic II Test (Euroimmun, Lübeck, 
Germany). Briefly, 1:100 diluted serum samples were 
added to each reaction field on biochips containing 
either uninfected cells or cells infected with PUUV, 
SAAV, DOBV, Hantaan virus (HTNV) or SEOV. 
Immunoblot assay
All ELISA-positive sera were further analysed using 
the recomLine Bunyavirus IgG/IgM test kit (Mikrogen, 
Neuried, Germany). In short, serum samples diluted 
1:100 were incubated on recomLine test strips contain-
ing six lines with complete nucleocapsid proteins from 
HTNV and PUUV, or a recombinant N-terminus of the 
nucleocapsid antigen from PUUV, HTNV, DOBV, SEOV 
or from sandfly fever virus serotype Toscana (TOSV), 
as well as a control band for the antibody class (IgG 
or IgM). 
Focus reduction assay
The focus-reduction neutralisation test (FRNT) was per-
formed as described previously [21]. An 80% reduction 
in the number of focus forming units (FFU) compared 
with the virus control was used as the criterion for 
virus neutralisation titres. 
Sample size determination 
and statistical analysis
The sample size determination was based on previous 
data from Switzerland  [20] and consisted of a two-
sample comparison of proportions with a ratio of 0.5 
between military personnel and blood donors (power 
80%, two-sided, p=0.05). For the statistical analysis, 
a positive ELISA combined with either a positive IFA 
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result and/or a positive or questionable immunoblot 
assay (IBA) was classified as a positive hantavirus 
serology (denoting a case). 
Due to the small number of cases, our analysis was 
restricted to the main potential risk factors. All vari-
ables were assessed univariately and by subsequent 
stepwise backward logistic regression using positive 
hantavirus infection as the outcome (STATA version 
12.1).
Results
Study population
A total of 1,810 blood samples were collected from mili-
tary personnel from May to December 2009. The par-
ticipation rate was 49.3% (1,810/3,673), of which 1,797 
(99.3%) were male and 13 (0.7%) were female. The ages 
of the participating personnel ranged from 18 to 56 
years, with a median of 21 years. 
A total of 4,559 samples were collected from blood 
donors in 114 locations during July to November 
2009 (Figure 1). The participation rate was 48.7 % 
(4,559/9,359), similar to that of the military person-
nel; however, men (2,720; 59.7%) and women (1,743; 
38.2%) were more equally represented. Data on age 
were unavailable for 96 (2.1%) of the donors sampled; 
the median age of the rest was 45 years (range: 18–65 
years).
Screening by enzyme-linked 
immunofluorescence assay
All sera were screened for hantavirus IgG using two dif-
ferent ELISA test systems. When the hantavirus ELISA 
was used, 405/4,559 serum samples from blood donors 
and 194/1,810 samples from military personnel were 
positive, corresponding to a seroprevalence of 8.9% 
and 10.7%, respectively (Table 1). However, according 
to the results obtained with the PUUV ELISA, 40 sam-
ples from the blood donors and 19 samples from the 
military personnel gave positive results, correspond-
ing to a prevalence of 0.9% in the blood donors and 1% 
among military personnel. 
Analysis by Immunofluorescence 
and Immunoblot assay
To obtain reliable seroprevalence data, following broad 
screening using two different ELISAs, all positive sam-
ples from both ELISAs (n=655) were further analysed 
by IFA and IBA. Both tests allow us to differentiate 
between hantaviruses causing disease in Europe and 
were used to confirm the ELISA results. Of the 655 
serum samples tested by IFA, 25 showed positive 
results for PUUV; six of these sera produced a strong 
or very strong immunofluorescence signal and 19 sera 
showed a weaker but still specific PUUV-fluorescence 
pattern (data not shown). Cross-reactivity with other 
hantaviruses (HTNV, SEOV, DOBV, SAAV) was observed 
for several sera (n=11), but differentiation was possible 
in most cases (n=8) by comparing the signal intensi-
ties to the different hantaviruses. One serum showed 
a specific reaction for the SAAV or DOBV antigen) and 
two sera showed a comparable fluorescence signal for 
PUUV and SAAV and/or DOBV.
When analysed by IBA, even fewer (n=16) of the 655 
sera tested showed positive or questionable band 
patterns for PUUV or other hantaviruses (illustrated 
in Figure 2). In most sera (11/16), the signal was spe-
cific for PUUV with only minimal cross reactivity to 
the antigens of other hantaviruses (Table 2). Two sera 
reacted specifically to DOBV, with minimal cross reac-
tivity; another showed a strong signal for both DOBV 
and HTNV. Several sera (n=24/6,369) reacted against 
the TOSV antigen (data not shown). The agreement 
between the different tests was good for sera produc-
ing strong IFA and IBA results but was only around 50% 
when the immunofluorescence signal was weak (Table 
2).
In summary, of all 655 ELISA-positive sera analysed in 
more detail, 30 showed clearly positive results by IFA 
and/or IBA.  A total of 26 were positive by IFA and 16 
gave positive (n=9) or questionable (n=7) band pat-
tern in the IBA, resulting in an overall seroprevalence 
of the 6,369 sera tested of 0.4% (IFA) and 0.3% (IBA). 
The seroprevalence in the blood donors (4,559 sera) 
was 0.5% when confirmation was based on the IFA and 
0.3% when IBA was used.
Table 1
Prevalence of hantavirus antibodies in the study populations by serological tests, Switzerland, 2009 (n=6,369)
Source of sera Number of sera tested
Number (%) of sera found positive or borderline for hantavirus antibodies
Hantavirus ELISA PUUV ELISA IFA IBA
Blood donors 4,559 405 (8.9) 40 (0.9) 22 (0.5)   13 (0.3)
Military personnel 1,810 194 (10.7) 19 (1.0) 4 (0.2)   3 (0.2)
Total 6,369 599 (9.4) 59 (0.9) 26 (0.4)   16 (0.3)
ELISA: enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay; IBA: immunoblot assay; IFA: immunofluorescence assay.
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Confirmation by focus reduction 
neutralisation test (FRNT)
Of the 30 sera showing clearly positive results by IFA 
and/or IBA, 14 were analysed for their neutralising 
capacity against PUUV and HTNV. At a dilution of 1:40, 
only two sera (numbers 682 and 4476) could neutral-
ise these hantaviruses (Table 2). While serum 624 was 
also capable of neutralising PUUV at a serum dilution 
of 1:80, serum 4476 was not. Both sera showed very 
strong positive results in the IFA and IBA assays. The 
other two sera with comparably strong reaction pat-
terns for PUUV by IFA and IBA (numbers 149 and 3051) 
did not reach the 80% reduction level required for a 
positive result in the FRNT. Nevertheless, they achieved 
a reduction of greater than 50% in FFU, indicating that 
neutralising antibodies against hantaviruses might 
be present. Sera with only weak signals in the IFA or 
IBA did not lead to a significant reduction of FFU in the 
FRNT (data not shown). 
Evaluation of risk factors for infection
To assess potential risk factors for hantavirus infection, 
univariate and multiple backwards logistic regression 
analyses were performed on positive serum samples 
cases (defined as having a positive ELISA test and 
confirmatory IFA and/or positive or questionable IBA 
results). No significant association of risk factors, such 
as recreational activities or travel to endemic countries 
with seropositivity was identified: only age (above 50 
years) was associated with an increased risk of sero-
positive ELISA and IFA or IBA assay. When dichotomised 
into two age groups (≤50, >50 years) and controlled for 
sex, the odds ratio was 2.36 (95% confidence interval 
(CI): 1.10–5.05), which indicates an approximately 2.5-
fold increased risk of hantavirus infection for people 
over 50 years-old. By place of residence (postal code) 
of 24 of the 25 blood donors with positive serum sam-
ples (information on postal code was missing for one 
donor), no clustering could be detected (Figure 1). 
Discussion
The seroprevalence of hantavirus infections of 
0.3–0.5%, estimated in blood donors from central 
Switzerland, is low compared with the seroprevalence 
observed in endemic regions of surrounding countries 
such as Baden-Württemberg in south-west Germany 
(about 2–3% [17,19]) but seems to be somewhat higher 
than the prevalence found in other countries where no 
Figure 2
Immunoblot pattern of serum samples analysed to confirm IgG antibodies against hantaviruses, Switzerland, 2009  
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IBA: immunoblot assay; DOBV: Dobrava virus; HTNV: Hantaan virus; neg: negative; pos: positive; PUUV: Puumala virus; quest: questionable; 
SEOV: Seoul virus. 
All sera (n=655) from blood donors and military personnel with a positive ELISA were confirmed by IBA. The immunoblots show examples of 
sera from blood donors rated positive, questionable and negative according to the band intensities. Serum samples were rated positive, if 
the PUUV+HTNV band was of stronger intensity compared with the cut-off-control (examples 4476 and 682) or if of equal intensity; at least 
one additional band of hantavirus serotype PUUV, HTNV, DOBV or SEOV had to be of at least equal intensity (example 2076). The result was 
estimated as questionable if only one of the bands was of equal intensity as the cut-off band (examples 183 and 1387) and negative, if the 
signal was weaker than the cut-off (example 2270) or absent (example 2798).
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Table 2
Summary of serological data of hantavirus-reactive serum samples, Switzerland, 2009 (n=30)
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Blood donors
149 pos 4.474 eqv 1.373 pos + ++ - - - pos ++ ++ - - - neg neg 
183 neg 0.707 pos 1.655 pos - + - - - pos + + - - - neg neg 
682 pos 1.614 eqv 1.412 pos + +++ - + + pos ++ ++ +/- +/- -  1:80  1:40 
977 pos 1.326 neg 0.355 neg - - - - - pos ++ +/- +/- ++ - ND ND
990 neg 0.171 pos 2.272 pos - ++ - - - neg - - -  -  - ND ND
1064 pos 1.742 neg 0.243 pos + + + + + pos ++ - ++ ++ - ND ND
1387 pos 1.337 eqv 1.285 neg - - - - - quest - + - - - neg neg 
1474 pos 1.611 neg 0.295 pos - + - - - neg - - - - -   ND    ND  
1483 neg 0.480 pos 1.585 pos - + - - - quest - + - - - neg neg 
2076 neg 0.845 pos 1.752 pos + + - - - pos + + - - - neg neg 
2270 neg 0.743 pos 1.633 pos + + - - - neg +/- +/- - - +/- neg neg 
2404 neg 0.242 pos 1.656 pos - + - - - quest + - - - - ND ND
2511 pos 1.847 neg 0.185 pos - + - - - neg - - - - - ND ND
2551 pos 2.047 neg 0.188 pos - + - - - neg - - - - - ND ND
2798 neg 0.092 pos 2.893 pos - + - - - neg - +/- - - - neg neg 
3051 pos 2.187 eqv 1.081 pos + ++ - - - pos ++ ++ - - - neg neg 
3115 pos 3.115 neg 0.297 pos - + - + + neg - - - - -   ND   ND
3389 pos 1.205 neg 0.472 pos - + - - - quest +/- + - - - neg neg 
3529 pos 1.889 neg 0.351 pos - + + + - neg - - - - - ND ND
3585 neg 0.245 pos 1.628 pos - + - - - neg - - - - - ND ND
4162 pos 3.487 neg 0.382 pos - + - - - neg - - - - - ND ND
4304 neg 0.307 pos 1.917 pos - + +/- - +/- neg - - - - - ND ND
4320 pos 3.707 neg 0.311 pos - + - - - neg - - - - - ND ND
4476 pos 3.421 pos 1.741 pos + +++ + ++ ++ pos ++ ++ +/- + -  1:40  1:40 
4521 pos 3.024 pos 1.589 neg unsp unsp unsp unsp unsp quest +/- + - - - neg neg 
Military personnel
I 147 pos 1.578 neg 0.557 neg - - - - - pos ++ - - - - ND ND
L55 pos 4.012 pos 1.644 pos - + - - - quest +/- + - - - neg neg 
R1 pos 3.911 neg 0.351 pos - - +/- + + quest - - - + - ND ND
M14 neg 0.153 pos 1.807 pos - + - - - neg - - - - - ND ND
X6 neg 0.659 pos 2.164 pos - +++ - - - neg +/- +/- - - - neg neg 
Cal: calibrator; DOBV: Dobrava virus; ELISA: enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay; eqv: equivocal; FRNT: focus reduction neutralisation 
test; HTNV: Hantaan virus; IFA:  immunofluorescence assay; ND: not done; neg: negative; OD: optical density; pos: positive; PUUV/HTNV: 
Puumala or Hantaan virus; PUUV: Puumala virus; ques: questionable; S: sample; SAAV: Saaremaa virus; SEOV: Seoul virus nucleocapsid 
protein; unsp: unspecific.
IFA     IBA
-               no signal    - no band
+/-          barely visible signal  +/- weak band
+             weakly positive signal  + band of equal intensity as cut-off
++          clearly positive signal  + + band of stronger intensity as cut-off
+++        bright, positive signal 
Listed are all samples that were found positive by ELISA screening and could be confirmed by either IFA or IBA. The OD ratio (OD of the sample 
divided by the OD of the calibrator for the two ELISAs and the signal intensities observed by IFA and IBA are indicated. Sera showing a 
positive signal by IFA or IBA were further analysed by FRNT. When positive, the serum dilution at which 80% focus reduction was achieved 
is indicated.
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or only very few HFRS cases were reported. In Spain, 
seroprevalence of 0.06% was found in 2003 in more 
than 10,000 sera from blood donors using methods 
comparable to those used in our study [22], while other 
studies published in 2002 and 2009, based on smaller 
number of samples and using different methods for 
screening and confirmation, reported a seropreva-
lence of 0.31% and 2% respectively for distinct areas 
in Spain [23,24]. In Italy, a serological study on sera 
collected in 2002 in the north of the country from 488 
forestry workers revealed no serum reaction to PUUV 
and, although a low seroprevalence for hantaviruses 
(0.4%) was found in bank voles [25]; no human cases 
of hantavirus infection were reported in Italy between 
2000 and 2010 [4,26].  In Spain, only a few HFRS cases 
were reported during the same time period [4,26]. In 
Switzerland, seven cases of hantavirus infections were 
documented between 2003 and 2010 [14].
In 2012, eight new cases of hantavirus infections were 
reported to the Swiss Federal Office of Public Health 
(incidence: 0.1 per 100,000 population) [14]. Seven 
of the cases were confirmed, of whom five had been 
infected in an endemic region outside Switzerland 
(Nicole Gysin, Federal Office of Public Health, per-
sonnal communication, 10 December 2013). This is in 
contrast to the situation in Baden Württemberg, south-
west Germany, where high numbers of infections were 
reported for 2012 (in weeks 1–17, n=501; incidence: 
4.66 per 100,000 population) [27]. In Germany as a 
whole, seroprevalence of 1–2% was estimated 1995, 
while values of over 5% were documented more recently 
for highly endemic regions of Baden-Württemberg 
(2001) and Lower Bavaria (2009) [17-19]. Considerable 
differences between neighbouring regions have often 
been observed with hantavirus infections [18,19].
Our study highlights the difficulties arising from limited 
test specificity when investigating the hantavirus sero-
prevalence retrospectively in a population with a low 
incidence of infections. To ensure maximum sensitivity, 
we used two different ELISA kits for the screening. The 
hantavirus ELISA is based on a pool of recombinant 
nucleoprotein antigens and should detect antibodies 
against the most frequently detected European HFRS-
causing hantaviruses. In our study, it is likely that this 
ELISA led to an excessively high rate of false-positive 
results, since very few of the 599 sera with positive 
results from the hantavirus ELISA could be confirmed 
by IFA or IBA. The reasons for this high proportion of 
non-specific reactions are unclear, but might be related 
to the recombinant antigens used or to problems asso-
ciated with washing parameters of the automated 
ELISA system used for the study, although the assay 
quality controls were within the kit specifications. In 
other serological studies, higher serum dilutions were 
used for screening [24] or an increased cut-off value 
was proposed [28] to get around the problem of non-
specific binding. The PUUV ELISA results for the same 
samples found that only 1% of the sera gave a positive 
OD ratio, indicating that this ELISA was less likely to 
generate false-positive results. 
Of the 655 sera analysed by both ELISAs, only 30 could 
be confirmed by either IFA and/or IBA. Since none of 
the tested individuals reported symptoms that could 
be unequivocally attributed to a previous or current 
hantavirus infection, it seems impossible to determine 
whether they had been infected with hantaviruses or 
not. The FRNT, used as third method to further evalu-
ate samples showing specific reaction to PUUV by IFA 
and IBA, is widely accepted as the gold standard for 
hantavirus serology of non-acute samples [21]. When 
an 80% reduction in FFU was applied as the cut-off, 
only two samples were positive at a serum dilution of 
1:40 and two more samples achieved a 50% reduction 
in FFU. These four sera showed a strong signal in the 
IFA and IBA. Interestingly, no clear reduction in FFU 
was observed for any of the other sera analysed, which 
raises the question of whether the excellent specific-
ity of the FRNT may be acquired at the expense of its 
sensitivity. For clinical infections, the presence of anti-
bodies has been demonstrated up to 10–20 years after 
infection, using the FRNT [16,29]. Whether this would 
also be the case for subclinical infections is unknown. 
Furthermore, the selection of the virus strain used in 
the FRNT may influence the outcome. In our study, neu-
tralisation was performed using a Russian PUUV strain 
(Kazan): the isolates circulating in central Europe may 
differ from this Russian isolate [30]. This may partially 
explain the fact that only sera with presumably high 
antibody titres led to a reduction in FFU. Interestingly, 
the neutralisation capacity of both sera that were posi-
tive in the neutralisation test was very similar for the 
two hantaviruses tested (PUUV and HTNV). This sug-
gests that the PUUV strain used either differed sub-
stantially from the virus causing the infection and/or 
that some of the tested individuals might have been 
infected with another hantavirus species. The presence 
of Tula virus, for example, has been documented in 
Switzerland, in a 10 year-old boy bitten by a small wild 
rodent in 2000 as well as in rodents trapped between 
2001 and 2009 [31,32].
Several laboratories in Europe use the IBA as diag-
nostic or confirmatory test [33,34]. This was also the 
method of choice in the earlier serological study per-
formed in the north-eastern part of Switzerland [20]. 
This analysis of blood samples from 2002–03 revealed 
a seroprevalence of 0.5% among blood donors and in 
occupational risk groups, with a higher seroprevalence 
observed only in the small group of military personnel 
(2/103; 1.9%). When the same criterion (positive IBA) 
was used for confirmation, we found a slightly lower 
seroprevalence of 0.3% in the blood samples collected 
mainly in the central part of Switzerland. The rather 
minor difference in prevalence obtained in the two 
studies may result from our larger sample size, meth-
odological differences when performing and interpret-
ing the assay or it may reflect a truly higher prevalence 
in the population in the north-east of the country. 
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However, even a population-representative sample 
would scarcely allow to detect (small) foci and the high 
sample size needed would have been impracticable. 
Hence the reason we sampled a population residing 
in mainly rural areas, as living close to forested areas 
was found to be a risk factor [35]. 
Some recreational/leisure or work-related activities are 
known to be risk factors for PUUV infection [36-38]; but 
this was not found in our study. Travel to other endemic 
countries, such as in Asia or south-east Europe, was 
also not found to increase risk. Both findings might 
be explained by the low case numbers. An association 
of age (above 50 years) with seropositivity was found, 
which is consistent with observations from Sweden 
[39] based on seroepidemiology, but not with German 
findings, which were based on notification data includ-
ing clinical symptoms [11]. This fact might be explained 
by the persistence and accumulation of hantavirus 
IgG antibodies in elderly persons in endemic regions, 
compared with those newly acquired in the course of 
a recent symptomatic infection within one epidemic 
season.
Although the large sample of blood donors was repre-
sentative for the blood donor population in Switzerland, 
this study is limited by the fact that blood donors differ 
from the general population in several aspects, includ-
ing health-related anthropometric and personality-
related variables [40]. In addition, although the blood 
donors samples covered well the region of central 
Switzerland, we do not have data on donors in other 
regions of the country. Although blood donors may not 
represent an ideal control group for diseases related 
to environmentally, behaviourally or socially patterned 
exposures [39], due to the ease of accessibility of 
blood samples and personal information, blood donors 
are popular study populations for serological analy-
sis. Serological data from blood donors may be used 
as basis value for comparative studies with population 
groups representing potential risk groups [20,41]. 
In our study, we compared the seroprevalence of blood 
donors residing in central Switzerland with that of 
young soldiers residing all over Switzerland. On the 
basis of prevalence data from a study performed in 
the north-eastern part of Switzerland in 2002–03, we 
investigated predominantly young soldiers as a poten-
tial risk group, but since their military service did not 
take place during a year of increased hantavirus activity 
in regions close to Switzerland, they were not at partic-
ular risk of infection [4,27,38]. Due to time-consuming 
preparatory work, the period of blood collection in 
the military personnel could not be handled flexibly 
and could not be postponed to the following year: in 
that year, increased numbers of hantavirus infections 
were documented in Germany [4,11]. Prevalence data 
from various populations, including blood donors, risk 
groups and symptomatic or asymptomatic volunteers 
from the general population, are available from sev-
eral European countries, rendering them attractive for 
comparative analysis between different regions [18,22-
24]. But, as we have shown, the methods applied to 
determine prevalence data need to be considered as 
well, when comparing different studies, since the influ-
ence of the test sensitivity and specificity on the deter-
mined seroprevalence may be substantial.  
In summary, we have found a low prevalence of han-
tavirus infections in the study populations, but the 
periodic hantavirus epidemics in neighbouring coun-
tries requires attention of public health authorities 
and measures of preparedness including active sur-
veillance need to be evaluated. Furthermore, at-risk 
populations – known from other studies to be people 
living in rural areas and people carrying out activities 
in areas and facilities infested by rodents – should be 
informed about potential exposure risk to hantaviruses 
and should be advised regarding precaution measures 
and symptoms.
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